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The homeland security community has struggled with a unifying system to support 
national preparedness even though states and local jurisdictions have gone to great 
lengths to enhance their capability. State preparedness reports, with inconsistent ranking 
systems and measurement tools that are self-assessments of individual capabilities, lack a 
holistic connection. The literature suggests that a one-size-fits-all assessment system has 
limited comparative value and has not proven to answer to the unique risks each state 
faces. By looking at the risk posture in each state and the unique capability needs, a 
model emerges that includes existing quantitative information and combines it with 
qualitative efforts sustained in emergency management. This research will introduce a 
predictive model that balances value-added inputs with intended results enhanced by 
leadership, with the organizational processes and performance outputs enhanced by 
management, into a system that delivers the outcomes intended with preparedness and 
further comparing it with current policy on national preparedness. With the demand by 
Congress to reconcile the treasury spent on homeland security, emergency management 
must find a system that balances both the measureable outputs and anecdotal impacts of 
preparedness that will guide each state toward improvement of its effort and secure 
strategies for future investments. 
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I. INTRODUCTION—DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
A. BACKGROUND 
The nation had awakenings from two different national disasters—the terrorist 
attack of September 11, 2001 (9/11), and the natural disaster in Hurricane Katrina in 
2005. With the asymmetrical threat of terrorism, reconfirmed by the disastrous events 
during Hurricane Katrina, the nation has focused on preparedness. Many federal dollars 
have been infused into states to build capability to respond to disasters, reduce risk, and 
mitigate consequences. At the same time, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
has struggled to find a unifying doctrine and system to support a national preparedness 
effort, even though states and local jurisdictions have gone to great lengths to enhance 
preparedness.  
The nation is significantly better prepared than it was on 9/11—there is significant 
anecdotal data, unique to the nation’s jurisdictions, to support this premise (Task Force, 
2010, p. x). To quantify response preparedness, the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) has been developing methods of assessment; however, the delivery of 
an objective system of performance measurement has been challenging. This challenge 
stems from differing levels of perceived risk across the country and statewide 
assessments that lack uniformity, resulting in slow development of a standardized, 
quantitative system for measuring risk. States and local jurisdictions have made 
significant strides in buying down risk by planning, partnering, and developing capability 
for the emergency management mission, even though FEMA has struggled with a 
national standard to show this progress. W. Craig Fugate, current FEMA Administrator, 
concedes that “it is easy to measure a process, but it is quite another thing to measure 
how that process has positively impacted a family or community” (2010, p. 7). 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Since 2002, federal homeland security grant funding to states has been in place to 
support homeland defense and security preparedness. Many local, state, federal, and 
military reports have been issued, and legislative hearings have attempted to define the 
preparedness question: “Are we better prepared than we were before 9/11?” These reports 
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have limited value other than to define the problem, and the measurement tools 
introduced by FEMA have simply been self-assessments of capabilities that have been 
retrospectively funded. Other than an actual event, only in full-scale, multi-agency, multi-
discipline exercises does one gain a glimpse of the preparedness progress. These 
exercises are costly to run, and they are arguably of little value when the players know 
the schedule of events in advance (Phillips, 2006). 
With over $37 billion appropriated (Congressional Research Service, 2009 and 
2010) to support homeland security programs for states and localities, there is little 
evidence to support that homeland security grants have had any measurable impact. With 
the exception of a few states, the grant programs have instead facilitated equipment 
upgrades for many public safety agencies in resource-strapped communities that have 
done little in the way of strategic planning, regional capability, and capacity 
development. Since peaking in 2003, homeland security grant programs have continued 
to recede (CanagaRetna et al., 2008, p. 53), although many interested parties advocate a 
substantial increase in federal funding. The current state of the U.S. economy would 
indicate that federal homeland security funding will decrease much further. As a result, a 
new approach for building response capability and measuring outcomes is necessary if 
the national government is to continue to lead the preparedness effort. Similarly, funding 
at the state and local levels has never been more under pressure, so all levels of 
government must explore alternative means for building and sustaining capacities. 
At this same time, the country faces threats every day from natural disasters, 
technological incidents, and terrorist attacks. Many regional disasters have national 
significance due to the interconnectedness of our society. Experts assert that the nation 
continues to be ill-prepared to respond effectively, and the responsibility to protect 
against such upheavals has fallen upon individual states (CanagaRetna et al., 2008, p. 53). 
For example, Wisconsin has two such state-level, resilience-building cooperative 
agreements that were not federally initiated. The first is the Mutual Aid Box Alarm 
System (MABAS), which is a fire service-to-fire service cooperative agreement with 
Illinois, and the second is a cooperative emergency management agreement, which was 
based on executive orders from the governors of Wisconsin and Minnesota. “With the 
future of homeland security funding uncertain, states must adopt a revised system for 
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development, sustainment and assessment of an emergency management enterprise to 
meet these challenges and build a resilient statewide vision [emphasis added]” (DHS, 
2012, p. 51). 
1. Contemporary Approach 
Capabilities-based planning (CBP) was first introduced by the Department of 
Defense (DoD) in the 1990s at the national level and has served the emergency 
management mission space well. This planning approach provided methods that allowed 
for deliberate considerations under uncertainty (Larson et al., 2001, p. 16). In the wake of 
9/11, it provided a means of protection that would be suitable for a wide range of 
modern-day challenges and circumstances, while working within an economic 
framework. The approach was a contrast to the military’s previous Cold War strategy of 
developing reactive responses to specific threats and scenarios. A strategy based on CBP 
served the emergency management mission space by providing the tools and benchmarks 
necessary to meet the challenges of an all-hazards emergency response or the 
asymmetrical terrorist threat (Larson et al., 2001, p. 9). 
To support these benchmarks, the DHS identified 37 target capabilities necessary 
to respond effectively to disasters (DHS, 2007b, p. iii). The target capabilities were 
intended to develop “a nation prepared with coordinated capabilities to prevent, protect 
against, respond to, and recover from all hazards in a way that balances risk with 
resources and need” (DHS, 2007b, p. v). The DHS also developed 15 high consequence 
planning scenarios designed to focus contingency planning on preparedness work at all 
levels of government and with the private sector (DHS, 2007a, p. iii). In 2011, the Obama 
Administration introduced Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8), which establishes 31 
core capabilities that, if achieved, would prepare the nation for specific types of incidents.  
2. Problems with Status Quo 
There are few quantifiable methods that have been developed so far to answer the 
effectiveness of preparedness in different jurisdictions and situations. There is no single 
quantitative method to assess preparedness, readiness, and capability—there are specific 
risks and cultures in each region that enter into the equation. To date, the capability 
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assessment systems proposed and in place have focused on a quantitative methodology to 
examine capabilities. The literature reveals inherent problems with metric-based 
methodology or self-assessment systems. Furthermore, too much emphasis has been 
placed on the individual capability and not enough on what impact is produced by a 
series of capabilities, working in concert, during a major disaster to accomplish an 
operational need. 
Many states outline a homeland security strategy that is heavily weighted on 
capabilities building. This approach aims to take a long-term, comprehensive approach 
toward accomplishing priorities in homeland security through prioritizing goals, 
measuring improvement in capability, and tracking progress (Wisconsin Homeland 
Security Council 2009, p. 3). A strategy of CBP, however, lacks outcomes-based metrics 
for measuring progress toward interdisciplinary emergency management performance 
and, ultimately, the intended impacts necessary for response to a major event. The 
metrics should lead to an intended outcome derived from the capability(s), the method for 
deployment, and the lead time necessary to put the capability into the arena of need—in 
short, what the emergency management agency is trying to achieve for its citizens. With 
no verifiable method of determining outcomes in advance of a disaster, questions exist 
about how individually planned and developed capabilities will manifest themselves 
during an actual disaster with other responders given the individual context of planning 
and capability building. 
A key missing function of CBP is the identification the capability gaps in 
preparedness as they relate holistically, specifically those “all-hands” capabilities 
necessary to build the resilient emergency management framework. The critical strands in 
a holistic emergency management helix are: 
 
• Capacity sufficiently adaptable to meet a state’s risk environment; 
• Prevention and mitigation before an event; 
• Sufficiency of operational capability, capacity, and readiness to respond; 
• Speed of protection measures during an event; and 
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• Interoperability of operational resources to resolve the event. 
This is accomplished by identifying, reducing, and eliminating the gaps that hinder a 
unified response. With a unifying strategy that provides goals and objectives to address 
those gaps, the intended requirements, standards, performance measures, actual response, 
and short-term recovery capabilities will be realized (FEMA, 2009a, p. 3). PPD-8, 
through the National Preparedness Goal (NPG), calls for the “capacity for the organized 
commitment of the whole community, in the shortest possible time and under all 
conditions” to meet the threats that pose the greatest risk to the Nation (DHS, 2011a, p. 
1). To meet the NPG, a unifying strategy within an emergency management framework 
must accompany that goal. Each state must find its individual definition of the goals and 
develop a strategy to accomplish them. 
The prevailing literature seeks quantitative ways to measure performance; 
however, the literature for the most part concedes that a measurement of outcomes is 
difficult and elusive (GAO, 2009, p. 69, Nelson, Lurie, & Wasserman, 2007, p. 10, 
Covington & Simpson, 2006, p. 3). Resources can be inventoried, personnel can be 
qualified, capability can be observed, but less tangible qualities that support outcomes, 
such as leadership and education, can only provide insights into preparedness (RAND, 
2008, p. vii)—as attributes that can predict success. Response outcomes are measured in 
the lives and property protected; the impact on social, political, environmental, and 
economic systems; and the resiliency of the community to adapt to the new normal in the 
aftermath. The quantitative efforts to measure capabilities alone do not address these 
preparedness goals. The response construct must exhibit the capacity and coordination 
necessary for large-scale disaster responses, and possess interoperability, 
cooperativeness, and collective action toward these outcomes. 
There is a need for a model that addresses the quantitative and qualitative 
capacities that have been developed since 9/11. A Congressional panel recommends that 
FEMA use both quantitative and qualitative information to more effectively capture 
outcomes based on grant distributions (NAPA, 2011, p. xii). The Obama Administration 
came into office recognizing the significant progress that had been made in improving the 
nation’s preparedness since September 2001 and is cognizant of the need to better 
understand and explain that progress—both qualitatively and quantitatively (Manning, 
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2012). To meet this need, a model is called for with a balanced approach that can be 
adapted for emergency management; one that possesses uniformity of time-tested inputs 
and processes, strategies, and smart practices, and that achieves outputs that are 
measurable and delivers the positive impacts we anecdotally know exist. This model 
would be a reasonable predictor of strategic success and could deliver the reliability of 
security and resilience outcomes the nation is seeking, instead of continuing down a 
quantitative-only journey to an end that does not completely provide a pathway to real 
preparedness. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Questions 
With the emphasis by Congress on homeland security performance, what benchmarks 
currently exist in emergency management for measuring outputs and impacts that 
indicate the level of preparedness of the nation? 
Can the balanced scorecard model be modified to improve a state government’s ability to 
measure and improve the effectiveness of emergency management investments? 
How would it compare to the guidelines found in Presidential Policy Directive 8? 
2. Secondary Research Question 
What performance outcomes should emergency management strive for, and what is a 
preferred strategy for achieving those outcomes? 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH  
Many organizations, including government entities, spend many staff hours and 
dollars on capability-building and strategic planning only to let that capital and human 
investment go to waste by failing to focus these efforts on the outcomes they are intended 
to deliver. This assertion is supported by the number of state homeland security strategies 
and emergency response plans on file. A strategic plan is necessary to bring these 
investments together for the purpose of reducing risk; it should offer a roadmap that 
considers tangible inputs, such as equipment and funding, and combines it with intangible 
assets, such as expertise, leadership, and innovation, into a collective “go forward” plan. 
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 FEMA has invested considerable time working on a national system to assess the 
level of preparedness since 9/11. So far, that national benchmark has yet to be fully 
defined. With the first National Preparedness Report scheduled for delivery in March 
2013, will the Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) and State 
Preparedness Report (SPR) deliverables identified in PPD-8 provide a statement on 
national preparedness? Will the report provide a framework for strategic success at the 
state and local level? 
1. The Research Direction 
An Outcomes-Balanced Framework (OBF) should instead be considered. It 
provides an interrelated framework to align the four focus areas of emergency 
management (inputs, processes, outputs, and impacts) with strategy—a strategy that 
pursues an emergency management vision of disaster resilience for communities and 
achieves stakeholder value, and at the same time provides an assessment of performance. 
In the framework proposed here, an argument is made that individual qualifications and 
assets gained are measurable outputs, and impacts are a combination of immeasurable 
conditions found in observation and local definition of achievement. Furthermore, the 
author will argue that management produces these measurable outputs and that leadership 
produces the anecdotal evidence of positive results that are not yet explained. With the 
uncertainties of future federal assistance, states must look to a system to develop, sustain, 
and assess whether the emergency management enterprise is meeting the resilient 
statewide vision and providing value to its citizens. The framework provides a 
mechanism that assures alignment of inputs, processes, outputs, and impacts into a 
system that emergency management can use to prospectively assess and predict success 
in meeting those goals. 
2. Chapters Ahead 
With over a decade since 9/11, a major transformation has taken place in the 
United States and beyond. Congress has demanded reconciliation and review of the 
significant treasury and effort by many professionals to answer the preparedness 
question: “Are we better prepared as a country than before 9/11?” The question posed by 
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Congress provides the impetus for exploring the question. Thus, far, the literature 
presented has provided background and the problem statement, and the research 
questions provide the purpose and significance for moving ahead with the research 
project.  
In the chapters ahead, the literature review will provide an overview of the 
existing federally-advocated approaches to preparedness and performance measurement, 
and then contrast it with that used by the private sector. The review will also look at the 
historic success of each approach, and an analysis will be drawn of the outcomes 
delivery. This initial analysis will suggest a hypothesis that will be proven or otherwise 
be modified based on the research methodology. In Section II, the author will take a 
deeper dive into the planning and assessment models established pre- and post-9/11 used 
to prepare the nation for terrorist attacks, technological hazards and disasters caused by 
nature. Again a comparison and contrast will be made with private sector performance 
assessment systems to find successes that could be applied to the national preparedness 
posture. Previous research by homeland security professionals suggests that a private 
sector performance system, called the Balanced Scorecard, merits further evaluation. 
From the literature on assessment systems, both governmental and business, 
Section III will explore the goal of preparedness: outcomes that support state-specific and 
national resilience. Based on the preparedness question and an outcomes end state, a 
model will begin to emerge using an outcomes logic model revealed in the research. The 
essential components of the outcomes logic model are inputs, processes, outputs, and 
impacts, and the value of each component to the end state of outcomes delivery. These 
essential components will be further fleshed out using successes that are anecdotally 
known to be effective in emergency management and homeland security. Reaching back 
to the Balanced Scorecard as an assessment and performance system and combining it 
with the outcomes logic model, a framework emerges that may answer the national 
preparedness question. 
The new framework becomes a predictive model to assess statewide preparedness 
and has the potential to provide a national view of preparedness in the aggregation that is 
based on the state perspective of risk and its available capacity to meet the risk. The 
conventional assessment of quantitative analyses of the enterprise must be balanced with 
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an equally rigorous qualitative assessment, as well; management activities and outputs 
achieved are equally balanced with emergent and collaborative leadership and the 
impacts it delivers during a disastrous event and toward the purposeful accomplishment 
of statewide preparedness. The framework also includes the importance and reliance on 
strategy as a state’s overarching methodology to realize its role in the national 
preparedness vision. The research concludes by exploring the utility of the synthesized 
Outcomes-Balanced Framework by drawing a direct comparison to the latest Presidential 
Policy Directive 8 on national preparedness. The research concludes with an assessment 
and contrast between the current policy and the proposed framework. 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review will provide a background for the current picture of 
preparedness in emergency management, specifically planning and building on 
capabilities. Capabilities-based planning (CBP), which started with the military with the 
1990s, served DHS well in the early years following 9/11; however, a method was 
missing that arranges all the developed capabilities into a unifying response that resolves 
the consequences of a disaster. The literature also provides a foundation for the difficulty 
in answering the nation’s preparedness questions about how well prepared we are as a 
nation, and how improvement would be accomplished, if needed, and explained. FEMA 
has developed several assessment systems, although most are based primarily on 
subjective self-assessments. The literature suggests a missing element in these assessment 
systems, that of achieving outcomes supporting the resilience of a community. Resilience 
is often referred to, but rarely defined and measured quantitatively. 
1. Federal Guidance 
The federal government, through DHS, provides a compelling need for 
developing emergency response preparedness and protecting the nation from disasters 
that impact our communities. The Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 5 
policy directs the Secretary of the DHS to provide assistance to state and local 
governments and to develop all-hazards plans and capabilities (The White House, 2003a, 
p. 2). The HSPD-8 established a national policy to strengthen the United States to 
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prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, 
and other emergencies (The White House, 2003b). The term, “capability,” is ill-defined 
throughout homeland security literature. Insofar as this research is concerned, capabilities 
are defined as the ability to execute specified courses of action defined by an operational 
user, expressed in broad operational terms, and based on a set of tasks and performance 
standards (McChrystal, 2009, p. 22). 
The military utilizes a set of capability documents called the Mission Essential 
Task List (METL). A METL contains the list of a command’s essential tasks with 
appropriate conditions and performance standards to assure successful mission 
accomplishment (DoD, 2005, p. 2). Similarly, to support the preparedness goals, DHS 
has developed the Universal Task List (UTL) containing 1600 unique preparedness and 
capability tasks that support the Target Capabilities List (TCL). The TCL contains 37 
core competencies designed as a guide for preparedness for a broad range of terrorism 
attacks and all-hazards response events (TCL, 2007, p. iii). These two documents form 
the basis for assessing emergency response preparedness and the development of mission 
outcomes at all levels of government (TCL, 2007, p. 1). 
Seven National Preparedness Goals emerged from HSPD-8 that was essential for 
emergency response and management of disasters. In January 2008, the DHS released the 
National Response Framework (NRF), the successor to the National Response Plan 
(NRP). The NRF establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic 
incident response, and incorporated many NRP elements along with lessons learned from 
the original plan. The new NRF provides guidance for the integration of community, 
state, tribal, and federal response efforts (NPD, 2007). Starting with the 2007 National 
Strategy for Homeland Security, resilience has become a focus for preparedness, and the 
NRF forms the basis and impetus for the development of resilience as an outcome; 
however, the definition was lacking. For the purpose of this research, a definition of 
resilience offered is to absorb, contain, adapt, and effectively recover from a major 
disturbance or an unexpected negative event to a point where a newly-formed sense of 
equilibrium and certainty returns. Within a comprehensive emergency management 
system, the true measure of the effectiveness of a “resilience system” during a negative 
event is the length of time endured between those two points. 
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The 2007 National Preparedness Directorate (NPD) was established to guide 
coordination and development of strategies necessary to provide a comprehensive cycle 
of planning and preparedness for all-hazards. As part of this mission, NPD developed the 
NPG outlining four critical elements of the core preparedness vision; specifically, the 
planning scenarios aimed at high-consequence events, identifying universal tasks to 
facilitate prevention, protection, response, and recovery efforts, and specific target 
capabilities that are necessary for an effective response to a disaster (NPG, 2007, p. 1). 
The literature contains considerable doctrine on CBP, especially within the 
private sector and the military. Taking off in 2005, homeland security professionals have 
begun to embrace CBP as a mechanism to meet the challenges caused by terrorism and 
natural and man-made disasters. The National Preparedness vision calls for coordinated 
capabilities to prevent, protect, respond, and recover from all hazards to balancing risk 
with resources and need (NPG, 2007, p. 1). The literature thus far continues to base the 
preparedness strategy and performance on capabilities, the development of which 
enhance preparedness, response, and recovery system and lead to the resilience of the 
nation (TISP, 2010, p. 9). 
The DHS has adopted the military model of CBP and has begun to link 
capabilities typically called for in disasters to outcomes in the five mission areas of 
prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. The military, conversely, 
emphasizes the need to link the objectives at all levels of war—from the national political 
level down to tactical and task level —in a logical, causal chain. This outcome-based or 
strategy-to-task approach became the de facto basis of planning doctrine (Hunerwadel, 
2006). While significant progress has been made developing capabilities, FEMA has still 
made only limited progress in assessing (GAO, 2010, p. 14) and linking them together. 
The DHS and FEMA would benefit from adopting a similar strategy-to-outcome 
approach framework that can be adapted to the challenges that exist with a top-down plan 
in the civilian environment. 
With a renewed focus on strengthening the security, preparedness, and resilience 
of the nation, the Obama Administration has re-established HSPD-8 to the PPD-8. The 
new directive established an NPG, which identifies core capabilities [emphasis added] 
that address the specific types of incidents that pose the greatest risk to the nation 
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(FEMA, 2011a, p. 8). The NPG calls for a secure and resilient Nation by including the 
capacity of an organized commitment of the whole community, in the shortest possible 
time under all conditions, to successfully prevent, protect, mitigate, respond, or recover 
from the these major disasters (FEMA, 2011, p. 1). The PPD-8 identifies the necessary 
performance objectives; however, it continues to be absent of the metrics for assessing 
performance on a statewide or state-specific basis. A review of the assessment tools 
explains the shortfall of a quantitative-only performance measurement system. 
2. Assessment Tools 
In an effort to gauge progress, six evaluation efforts have been identified by DHS 
as keys to the assessment of preparedness—the State Preparedness Reporting (SPR) 
system, the National Incident Management System Compliance Assistance Support Tool 
(NIMSCAST), the Grants Reporting Tool (GRT), the Logistics Capability Assessment 
Tool (LCAT), the Gap Analysis Program (GAP), and the Cost-to-Capability (C2C) pilot 
program (GAO, 2010, p. 9). FEMA has further been developing a Comprehensive 
Assessment System (CAS), but to date has not released it. Each of the current evaluation 
efforts is based on self-assessment, leading to inconsistent results. For example, the 
NIMSCAST was developed by FEMA to evaluate and report achievement in NIMS 
compliance objectives. It is a comprehensive self-assessment system identifying 
successes and shortfalls in compliance, identifying best practices, and providing technical 
assistance from the National Integration Center (NIC) (FEMA, 2009b, p. 4). However, 
full compliance is unachievable based on subjective definitions and FEMA’s lack of 
reasonable assurance that entities have taken actions aimed at improving preparedness 
(GAO, 2009). 
FEMA has concentrated its efforts on the CAS as a mechanism for capabilities 
assessment. It is based on the five-step process of defining, collecting, analyzing, 
reporting, and improving preparedness data (GAO, 2010, p. 27). The CAS was 
envisioned to effectively assess prevention, response, and recovery capabilities; eliminate 
redundant data calls; reduce the burden on respondents; and ensures the collection of 
meaningful data to guide policy and resource allocation decisions (FEMA, 2010a). To 
date, the CAS has not been implemented, due in large part to the revisions in HSPD-8 
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leading to the 2011 release of PPD-8, the modifications in capabilities in the NIMS 
Training Plan (DHS, 2011c, p. v), and questions about collection of the right information 
without undue burden on the states (OIG, 2008, p. 10). 
In the private sector, the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) has been used successfully 
for measuring performance (Niven, 2003, p. 4); it defines a measurement tool for 
financial and customer results, operations, and organizational capacity. The BSC, 
developed in the early 1990s, provided a look at the results of operations (qualitative) in 
the form of customer satisfaction and the analytic benchmarks (quantitative) in the form 
of financial returns (Kaplan and Norton, 1992, p. 73). It was also designed to measure 
non-financial performance; align vision and mission with customer requirements and 
day-to-day work; manage and evaluate business strategy; monitor operation efficiency 
improvements; build organization capacity; and communicates progress to all employees 
(Rohm, 2002, p. 1). 
Sharon Caudle, a researcher and faculty member at the Bush School of 
Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, asserts that the BSC can be 
applied to homeland security enterprise (Caudle, 2008). She offers five relationships that 
must be accounted for in the homeland security BSC: public stewardship, clientele 
impact, day-to-day processes, human capital support, and enabling support. Caudle’s 
assertion concludes with an underlying question: “What scorecard design and 
organizational factors can respond to the complexities of homeland security delivery, 
partner relationships, and the responsibilities and resulting strategy agreement (Caudle, 
2008)?” Caudle’s question prompts further research about the efficacy and utility of the 
BSC for performance measurement in emergency management. 
3. Outcomes Focus 
The literature stresses the importance of measurable outcomes for gauging the 
effectiveness of the organizational, collaborative, and planning efforts. Government 
organizations have been given increasingly stronger mandates to improve effectiveness. 
This began with the Government and Performance Results Act, which mandated strategic 
planning and a focus on results, impacts, and outcomes (Whittaker, 2003, p. 8). And now 
with the treasury appropriated to preparedness to date and the passing of the 10-year 
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anniversary of 9/11, the nation demands accountability and a reconciling of the cost to 
the benefits achieved. 
The 2002 Homeland Security Strategy called for emergency preparedness, 
capability enhancement, and incident management (2002, p. 42), and the 2007 strategy 
was designed to link programs and operations to performance measures, mission goals, 
resource priorities, and strategic objectives (HSS, 2008, p. 2). A significant event that has 
reshaped emergency management and the homeland security paradigm was the Hurricane 
Katrina disaster in 2005, resulting in the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform 
Act (PKEMRA). The PKEMRA shifted emphasis to improved measurement of desired 
mission outcomes and the contribution of programs, activities, and resources to mission 
outcomes (QHSR, 2010, p. 78), as well as a focus on shortening recovery time to a sense 
of normalcy. 
The outgoing secretary of the DHS, Michael Chertoff, asked that the Homeland 
Security Advisory Council develop 10 key challenges for the incoming secretary. Two of 
those key challenges, in particular, support the need for future study: “the work of 
strengthening our Nation’s disaster response capabilities is not complete” and “lead the 
building of a resilient America” (HSAC, 2008, p. 5). There is a nexus in these challenges 
that prompts research: to the develop capabilities that are flexible, scalable, adaptable, 
and interoperable, and that perform and achieve the emergency management mission 
outcomes necessary to prepare, respond, recover, and adapt to the “new normal” created 
by the disastrous event. These emergency management outcomes can be reasonably 
predicted, observed in action, qualitatively measured, and improved through a task-to-
outcomes balanced construct as the military has. 
The nation is now on a path moving from a strategy based on capability-based 
planning (The White House, 2003a) and development to resilience building system (The 
White House, 2011); it is a system with an agile, flexible approach to prevent, protect, 
mitigate, respond, and recover, with core capabilities that can be mixed and matched as 
needed (The White House, 2011). The desired outcomes are contained in a set of focused 
planning frameworks that support the need and effective delivery of these core 
capabilities described in the National Preparedness Goal (2011, p. 1). Collectively, PPD-
8 proposes a system, the National Preparedness System (NPS), that provides an 
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instrument to build, sustain, and deliver the core capabilities to achieve the goal of a 
secure and resilient nation (DHS, 2011b, p. 1) with essential, common capabilities 
required across the whole community; they are highly interdependent and will require 
using existing preparedness networks and activities, improving training and exercise 
programs, promoting innovation, and ensuring that the administrative, finance, and 
logistics systems are in place to support these capabilities (DHS, 2011c, p. 1). To 
accomplish this, a performance monitoring and improvement framework is necessary to 
monitor and complete these national goals and realize the preparedness vision, although 
at a state-focused level. 
4. State Preparedness Position 
While the federal government has been searching for a method to assess 
preparedness progress, emergency management has continued to pursue an “all hazards” 
direction on preparedness and disaster response. This direction has not only included 
capability and capacity planning, and development of response and recovery systems to 
meet statewide goals, but it has also included the development of an enterprise of holistic 
planning, trained professionals, and supporting relationships. By coordinating the 
resources of the traditional response and recovery agencies (i.e., law enforcement, fire 
services, and the Red Cross) and partnering with non-traditional agencies (i.e., private 
sector businesses and faith-based communities), emergency management is able to gain 
force multipliers through horizontal integration. States can point to successful response 
and recovery efforts, such as the response to the Joplin, Missouri, tornado (FEMA, 
2011b) in delivering this outcomes-based, bottom-up holistic approach. 
F. HYPOTHESIS 
The overarching goal of the initiatives presented is to answer the preparedness 
question: “Are we better prepared than we were on 9/11?” While the nation has improved 
capability, an assessment and improvement system is necessary for accountability of the 
treasury spent so far. With the uncertainty of future funding, the focus of these dollars 
must be toward the internal inputs and processes to tell us if we are “doing things right” 
by providing proper public stewardship; and by the assessment of outputs and impacts of 
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preparedness to tell us that we are “doing the right things” insofar as providing value to 
and protection of the public. Beyond quantitative-only assessments that have thus far 
been inconclusive, there are intangible assets, systems, and practices that can and should 
be assessed and should be considered when providing the answer to our progress in state-
focused preparedness. 
The literature suggests a model is necessary to guide the nation beyond the 
preparedness conundrum. By looking at the need and reality, a model does emerge that 
can leverage existing quantitative information and combine it with qualitative actions 
found in emergency management activities and responses. It also can enhance the valued 
outcomes the public is seeking during preparedness and during a disaster. A blended 
framework that provides a system to measure performance and monitor progress can be 
developed for emergency management. The goal of this research is to balance the 
intangible inputs with the intended results through leadership, along with the 
organizational processes and performance outputs through management, into a system 
that delivers the outcomes that preparedness is intended to achieve. The outcomes must 
be weighted by metric performance measures where possible, and impacts on the quality 
of life that we see must be anecdotally delivered. 
The BSC developed in the early 1990s provided a look at the impacts of 
operations (qualitative) and the analytic benchmarks (quantitative) (Kaplan and Norton, 
1992, p. 73) for assessing progress. In the private sector, the BSC has been used 
successfully because it defines a measurement tool for financial and customer results, 
operations, and organizational capacity. It was designed to measure non-financial 
performance; it aligns vision and mission with customer requirements and day-to-day 
work; it manages and evaluates business strategy; it monitors operation efficiency 
improvements; and it builds organization capacity (Rohm, 2002, p. 1).  
Can the BSC model be modified to improve state government’s ability to measure 
the effectiveness of emergency management investments? The BSC was used by private 
industry for performance reporting, but not solely based on financial bottom line. 
However, governmental reporting demands accountability of performance outputs for 
expenditures, even though government provides services that typically are not cost-
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effective and would not be attractive to private industry. The BSC also focuses on the 
value created by the organization for its customers to create loyalty, and not merely on 
the bottom line. Many assert that, with some adjustments, the BSC can be applied to the 
public sector (Rohm, 2002, p. 3, Caudle, 2008, p. 14, Marr, 2010, p. 7) and can be 
adapted to measure the existing preparedness accomplishments in the homeland security 
enterprise that Congress is demanding.  
G. METHOD 
1. Preparedness Planning 
Preparedness does not end with a plan; planning is a continuous process and a 
valuable tool for capacity and leadership building. Dwight Eisenhower, the top allied 
general of the Second World War, stated that “plans are nothing; planning is everything.” 
As such, a review of the existing state strategies is appropriate for analyzing the 
contemporary planning processes and strategy development that assesses performance 
and improvement. The review will also include the analysis of performance assessment 
tools provided by the DHS, the contemporary approach with CBP, and the performance 
and value-added benchmarks that support the security and resilience outcomes.  
The second part of the primary research question asks if the BSC model currently 
in use by the private sector—and projected for the public and non-profit sectors—can be 
modified to improve a state government’s ability to measure and improve the 
effectiveness of emergency management investments. Private industry has been 
developing and utilizing performance assessment tools to improve the bottom line (profit) 
for many years. However, private industry assessment systems go beyond the quantitative 
measures (i.e., profit, material outputs, and production time studies) to qualitative 
measures of information capital, research and innovation, and customer and vendor 
relationships. Despite the importance to a company’s vitality, these measurements can be 
difficult to measure other than by outcomes (e.g., brand loyalty and value to consumers). 
For long-term sustainability of an organization, strategic mapping, planning, and 
visioning are useful tools for strategy development and assessing the preferred goals that 
are measured for effectiveness. Specifically analyzing and measuring the tangible and the 
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intangible inputs, processes, outputs, and impacts provide a gauge, direction and health of 
the organization, and a confirmation of the strategy chosen. Besides the analysis of the 
BSC, the review will include the long-standing private sector performance models used 
today—Total Quality Management and Six Sigma. 
The secondary research question supports the first in establishing the elements 
that are critical to emergency management success. Throughout the research, the 
benchmarks of successful programs and indicators of performance will be identified that 
support stakeholder value. History and experience tell us that emergencies and disasters 
will happen, but it is imperative for an emergency management system to have plans and 
an operational framework in place to protect and quickly recover to a sense of normalcy. 
The shorter the time horizon from the disaster to point of normalcy will determine a 
community’s level of preparedness and the success in achieving resilience. The critical 
“quality of life” areas in a community that emergency management must support are: 
• Operations supporting life and property safety; 
• Community heritage and historic treasures; 
• Infrastructure and continuity of government; 
• Social support and community systems; and 
• Economic vitality and environmental protection. 
2. Preparedness Assessment 
A comprehensive preparedness assessment system called for by Congress has thus 
far proved difficult to deliver because the current assessment systems are simply self-
assessments based on subjective evaluation. One can easily measure a process, but it is 
quite another thing to measure how that process has positively impacted a family or 
community (Fugate, 2010, p. 7). The preparedness assessment then should focus as much 
attention on processes and tangible outputs as it does on intangible inputs and the impacts 
resulting from the emergency management system. Furthermore, a one-size-fits-all 
system does not address state-specific differences in risk, nor does it account for the will 
of the people of a state in funding those national benchmarks. 
Attempts so far to develop a comprehensive assessment system have focused on 
self-assigned, numeric-based systems with subjective benchmarks. Only through 
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exercises and actual events can one capture a glimpse of capability in action and whether 
it had a positive impact on resilience. Considerable planning, discussion, and dry runs go 
into exercises under the HSEEP guidelines, and for good reason. As stated earlier, 
“planning is everything” because it is here where relationships, collaboration, and 
cooperation are forged. How does one assess this critical step? Nevertheless, there are 
arguments against the utility of some types of exercises, like the National Level Exercise 
(NLE), described as “unrealistic, costly, and over scripted . . . an elaborate game” 
(Bellavita, 2010). Furthermore, exercises are forced into short timeframes due to 
personnel costs and unit out-of-service time. This can often create unrealistic and atypical 
conditions that resources are actually deployed and where decisions are rehearsed. 
Additionally, exercise designers typically pre-stage resources for safety reasons, and 
players quickly escalate to the highest level of response to accommodate the exercise 
objectives—again, unrealistic actions by responders during real world events. 
3. Case Study – National Preparedness 
In March 2011, President Barack Obama issued the PPD-8, which called for 
refocusing on our national preparedness. While similar in many ways to its predecessor 
(the HSPD-8), PPD-8 ushered in a heavier emphasis on identifying and managing risk 
with a vision of creating a resilient nation. Like HSPD-8, the PPD-8 focused on 
capabilities, introducing a modified and upgraded 31 “core capabilities” as compared 
with the earlier 37 target capabilities. The PPD-8 outlined a system for national 
preparedness, called the NPS, which attempts to provide guidance for the development of 
risk-based capabilities where it had lacked standardization before. The NPS considered 
local and statewide differences in risk and capability needs, rather than a one-size-fits-all 
preparedness methodology. 
This thesis attempts to draw such an analogy between the PPD-8 and the proposed 
OBF model. The goal is to demonstrate the utility of the proposed model and compare it 
to the current national system that has been outlined in PPD-8 and is currently being 
used. Both models are in agreement that the traditional preparedness method, 
capabilities-based planning, requires an evolution to strategy and vision-centric 
methodology; however, each has differing avenues to achieve that end state. While it may 
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be somewhat premature to judge the effectiveness of the NPS, there is considerable value 
in drawing similarities and differences between the national model and the proposed 
model in achieving national preparedness. 
4. Quantitative and Qualitative Analyses 
Why research preparedness by examining both qualitative and quantitative 
perspectives? The answer will be found in data that can be measured, as well as in 
successful outcomes that can only be observed. It is analogous to the management and 
leadership discourse for the success of an organization—each contributes to the success 
of the whole and the absence of one leads to its demise. Quantitative evidence is 
objective and is primarily data-driven; it is a measure of numbers, statistics, and 
hypotheses, and models can be monitored and tested with the data. On the other hand, 
qualitative evidence is difficult to prove due to subjective interpretation that cannot be 
shown by data—evidence is revealed through an inductive methodology of informed 
opinions, firsthand experiential accounts, and a process of forming conclusions based on 
observations. The research will account for capabilities that have been developed 
quantitatively in terms of the capability developed, personnel qualified, exercises 
conducted, and equipment purchased, and qualitatively in terms of how the capability 
performed in an actual event or exercise, the relationships developed and knowledge 
gained, and the relative resilience of a community. 
The goal of this research is to produce a predictive, balanced model that can be 
used to gauge existing data, systems, structures, and methods to support and enhance our 
preparedness efforts. The model leverages available quantitative information and 
highlights the qualitative successes that influence positive outcomes in emergency 
management. The model stresses how strategy that aligns and balances the four focus 
areas of an organization—inputs, processes, outputs, and impacts—supports the 
emergency management mission space. 
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II. ANALYSIS OF PERFORMANCE MODELS 
In this section, the research will look into the planning and assessment models 
that have been established both pre- and post-9/11. The purpose is to discover the utility 
and results of these planning efforts toward preparing the nation for terrorist attacks, 
technological hazards, and natural disasters. The research will identify the same in the 
private sector for planning and performance assessment systems. It will then compare and 
contrast these models and identify successes that could be applied to the national 
preparedness. Previous research by homeland security professionals and municipalities 
suggests that a private sector performance system, called the Balanced Scorecard, has 
merit for this research and performance assessment in the government arena. 
A. CAPABILITIES-BASED PLANNING 
The military philosophy on capabilities-based planning began with a transition in 
the mid-1990s from a threat-based to a capabilities-based strategy in the wake of the 
dismantling of the Soviet Union. CBP is a class of all-hazards planning, and it addresses 
these planning events under conditions of uncertainty and the growing uncertainty in the 
threat environment by using a wide range of possible scenarios. It tries to bound 
requirement capabilities suitable for a wide range of threats and hazards within an 
economic framework that necessitates prioritization and choice (U.S. Legal, 2011). 
Further, CBP is an integral component of the 2005 NPG resulting from HSPD-8. This 
planning approach provided methods that allowed for deliberate considerations under 
uncertainty (Larson et al., 2001, p. 16), and provided a means of protection that would be 
suitable for a wide range of modern-day challenges and circumstances, while working 
within an economic framework. It was a contrast to the military’s previous Cold War 
strategy of developing reactive responses to specific threats and scenarios. In the wake of 
9/11, the CBP strategy served the emergency management mission space by providing 
the tools and benchmarks necessary to meet the challenges of an all-hazards emergency 
response or an asymmetrical terrorist threat (Larson et al., 2001, p. 9). 
To support these benchmarks, the DHS identified 37 target capabilities necessary 
to respond effectively to disasters (DHS, 2007b, p. iii). These target capabilities were 
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intended to develop “a nation prepared with coordinated capabilities to prevent, protect 
against, respond to, and recover from all hazards in a way that balances risk with 
resources and need” (TCL, 2007, p. v). The DHS also developed 15 high consequence 
planning scenarios designed to focus contingency planning on preparedness work at all 
levels of government and with the private sector (DHS, 2007a, p. iii). The PPD-8, which 
is a revision of the origin 2003 HSPD-8, reestablished the all-hazards NPG in 2011. The 
PPD-8 established core capabilities related to the mission areas, its descriptions, and 
associated performance objectives addressing the meta-scenario (multiple maximum 
events), focusing these core capabilities on necessary functions during a major disaster. 
For example, there are 13 core capabilities in the response mission space—the first six 
core capabilities enable a rapid and effective response, while the remaining seven address 
the recovery needs and priorities of the survivors and communities impacted by the 
catastrophic event (Review PPD-8, 2011, p. 12). 
1. Capabilities Strategy 
Private industry has also recognized capability-based strategies since the early 
1990s and has based the strategy on the notion that internal resources and core 
competencies derived from distinctive capabilities provide the strategy platform that 
underlies a firm’s long-term profitability. (Richards, 1999). If one removes “profitability” 
and replaces it with today’s “resiliency,” the homeland security relationship is 
comparable. What can be learned from the capability building experiences of private 
industry, and how it can relate to the homeland security mission? 
The benefit of this capabilities-based strategy is the development of a “resilience 
capacity.” In the business world, an organization’s resilience capacity captures its ability 
to take situation-specific, robust, and transformative actions when confronted with 
unexpected and powerful events that have the potential to jeopardize an organization’s 
long-term survival (Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 2008, p. 2). One can draw this same 
correlation that the nation’s psychological resilience capacity was borne out of the events 
of 9/11 by the country’s transformative action toward terrorism. One might also conclude 
that capabilities are integral to a resilience strategy; however, capabilities alone without 
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regional coordination and partnering— delivering capacity, readiness and timeliness—
cannot provide resilience. 
The nation has not yet mastered collaborative development of capability and unity 
of effort on a holistic basis—that is, all of the state’s assets working interoperably within 
a single mission space. Other than certain special military units (e.g., the Civil Support 
Teams (CST) and hazardous materials teams), few local responders have worked with the 
state’s National Guard (NG). Therefore, they have little understanding of the assets and 
roles they will play in a meta-scenario. Conversely, the state’s military are operationally 
unfamiliar with local resource capabilities and the use of the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) Incident Command System (ICS). As a disaster requires 
statewide or national coordination, the lines of authority and command become difficult 
to navigate. Local agencies and higher levels of government act in much the same way. 
Due to the lack of familiarity with other like capabilities, these agencies cling to their 
agency or discipline silo rather than work within a coordinated structure. 
2. Operational Strategy 
However, operational assets, resources, and capabilities are not enough; the 
documents also indicate that collaboration is the key element in developing a capabilities-
based strategy. Collaboration links capability together to develop operational capacity—it 
is not just about capability building; it’s about capacity deploying. Operational capacity 
can be defined as the personnel, equipment, facilities, systems, processes, and 
preparations, along with the readiness to use them (Catlett, 2010, p. 8). Operational 
capacity has a major impact on outcomes and resilience. What happens in the initial 72 
hours of a large-scale emergency or disaster will determine the time to new normal. The 
difficultly with CBP without collaborative planning is that it promotes vertical integration 
within organizations, agencies, and disciplines, rather than the horizontal integration 
through the development of complementary, collaborative capacities across a state’s 
portfolio of resources. 
A strategy is needed that takes the homeland security enterprise beyond the 
exclusive capabilities-building approach to one that holistically meets the challenges of 
the asymmetrical actions of terrorism and an all-hazards response to natural and man-
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caused disasters. The shortfall of CBP is that it is solely based on capability development 
and does not accomplish the planning and operational realities of a catastrophic incident. 
Capability must be tied to mission, function, or objective (DHS Risk Lexicon, 2010, 
p.16) in a comprehensive approach; an approach that is holistic; and an approach that is 
in concert with all stakeholders—public sector, private sector, military, and its citizenry. 
The CBP approach continues to have value, however, since it supports regional 
planning; it strengthens information sharing; and enhances communications 
interoperability—the necessary inputs of a preparedness system. Additionally, CBP 
supports the implementation of the NIMS, the NRF, and the National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan (NIPP), some of the processes of a preparedness system. Capabilities 
planning alone without a comprehensive, adaptable method of achieving the holistic 
operational impacts will leave the national preparedness question unanswered. The utility 
and history of CBP and the existence of the DHS documents places an emphasis on 
preparedness and underscores the importance of developing these essential capabilities 
within emergency response systems. The next section will review the DHS performance 
assessment systems used to date and contrast them to the performance management 
systems of the private sector used to achieve outcomes. 
B. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY ASSESSMENT SYSTEMS 
Congress has demanded accountability through measurement of the performance 
of the homeland security enterprise; however, DHS has struggled with developing a 
measurement system and reliable processes that would account for the evolving nature of 
homeland security. In an effort to gauge progress, six evaluation efforts have been 
developed by DHS for preparedness assessment: the State Preparedness Reporting 
System (SPRS), the National Incident Management System Compliance Assistance 
Support Tool (NIMSCAST), the Grants Reporting Tool (GRT), the Logistics Capability 
Assessment Tool (LCAT), the Gap Analysis Program (GAP), and the Cost-to-Capability 
(C2C) pilot program (GAO, 2010, p. 9). FEMA has yet to implement the five-step central 
repository for national preparedness data, known as the Comprehensive Assessment 
System, called for in HSPD-8 in 2003 and later in 2006 with the Post-Katrina Emergency 
Management Reform Act (FEMA, 2009). 
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1. State Preparedness Report 
The SPRS is a self-assessment system where states assess preparedness goals and 
individual state gap analyses against the TCL. The definitions, goals, and risks are 
subjectively interpreted by a state, as well as the end outcomes envisioned. For example, 
a state can define interoperability in different ways. Interoperability could be defined in 
terms of communication between teams, between disciplines, or effective 
communications between coordination systems; it can range from interpersonal voice 
communication to a technology-focused capability to operational effectiveness. With no 
clear definition and guidance, each state will report differently and results will be subject 
to interpretation (GAO, 2010, p. 13). The State of Wisconsin developed on a statewide 
communication system-of-systems to provide 95% coverage from a mobile radio 
throughout the state (OJA, 2011). The state chose to leverage existing VHF, state-owned 
infrastructure that provided both an interoperable communication system at the 
interagency coordination level, and it also provided a framework for municipal and 
county agencies to build out their localized systems for in-building coverage. The 
neighboring state of Minnesota developed a statewide system, using 800 MHz spectrum, 
for in-building coverage for all public safety agencies to provide a range of 
communication uses, from day-to-day operations to statewide coordination (MN-DOT, 
2010, p. 2). Each state can define interoperability in its own way, basing it on its 
individual need, so they have achieved communication interoperability by the state’s 
definition placed on the target or core capability; in this example, however, 
interoperability is not uniformly assessed, nor is it universally defined as a performance 
measure. 
Additionally, multiple scoring scales have been used and inherent political 
challenges exist with this report. The 2010 SPRS was based on a 10-point scale based on 
the TCL, and the 2011 report utilizes a five-point scale against the core capabilities. If the 
goal of this reporting system was to measure progress over time, the system lacks 
standardization for scoring, scoring criteria, and the measure of successful completion. 
As previously stated, the SPRS is based on self-assessment, and as such, participants in 
the grading typically cannot represent the level of preparedness of the entire state. The 
evaluator’s objectivity is called into question when the evaluator is scoring with thoughts 
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of potential political ramifications and media interest in a true low score. Furthermore, 
there is equal pressure with the potential for reduction in funding in a given category for a 
high score. 
2. National Incident Management System Compliance Assistance 
Support Tool 
The NIMSCAST was developed by FEMA in 2004 to evaluate and report 
achievement in NIMS compliance objectives. It was designed for the emergency 
management community as a comprehensive self-assessment system identifying 
successes and shortfalls in compliance, identifying best practices, and providing technical 
assistance from the NIC (FEMA, 2009b, p. 4). The NIMSCAST is designed as an 
instrument for federal departments and agencies, as well as state, territorial, tribal, and 
local governments to evaluate and report their jurisdiction’s progress and achievement of 
NIMS implementation. As a self-assessment tool, the results were unreliable, and it 
further lacked reasonable assurance that entities had taken actions aimed at improving 
preparedness (GAO, 2009). 
3. Grants Reporting Tool 
The GRT is a reporting system to monitor financial and programmatic 
information from states and local and tribal governments for grants received and 
cooperative agreement awards. The information enables FEMA to evaluate applications 
and make award decisions, monitor ongoing grant performance and manage the flow of 
Federal funds, and appropriately close out grants or cooperative agreements (FEMA, 
2009c, p. 59,216). GRT supports the information collection needs of FEMA for each 
grant program and progress made in developing capabilities (GAO, 2010, p. 10). The 
GRT is designed to be a quality assurance system for accounting of grant funds, rather 
than as a preparedness assessment system. 
4. Logistics Capability Assessment Tool  
The LCAT was designed by the FEMA’s Logistics Management Directorate for 
use by states to improve readiness, increase response capacity, and maximize the 
management and impact of homeland security resources (Fugate, 2011). The LCAT is 
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tailored for use by states to evaluate their current disaster logistics readiness, identify 
areas for targeted improvement, and develop a roadmap to both mitigate weaknesses and 
further enhance strengths (FEMA, 2010b, p. 3). Even though FEMA has developed this 
tool, the corresponding logistics improvements at the state and local levels have lagged 
behind. Some states do not have adequate logistics functions, and the situation is unlikely 
to change in the current fiscal environment (OIG, 2010, p. 4). Furthermore, the LCAT is 
self-reporting system for states to categorize and inventory logistics resources in the 
individual states. The LCAT indicates potential and is lacking performance measurement. 
5. Gap Analysis Program 
The goal of the GAP is to improve operational readiness and reduce disaster 
impacts by identifying and reducing or eliminating shortfalls that exist between estimated 
requirements, standards, and performance measures and the actual response and short-
term recovery capabilities (GAP, 2009, p. 3). The GAP is based on selected disaster 
scenarios from critical area list and focuses on the initial 72-hours of the response, which 
does not assess the whole response system for a meta-scenario. The GAP is beneficial for 
assisting states to identify deficiencies in an individual state’s system. However, the 
information would be difficult to uniformly aggregate over the entire state emergency 
management enterprise. 
6. Cost-to-Capability Program 
The C2C was established as a rear-looking initiative to help better analyze the 
impact that awarded grants have had for future grant planning. It was developed by 
FEMA’s Grant Management Directorate and intended to be a system to support decision-
making about effectively managing FEMA’s grants and to assist grant recipients of those 
funds. The metrics have yet to be developed. Even when complete, the C2C results are 
intended to measure grant performance and will fall short of measuring vulnerability or 
preparedness (FEMA, 2009, p.12). Input data is to be based on self-assessments of 
capabilities from state preparedness plans, estimates of baseline capability, and the 
estimated relative capability improvement expected from the investment (CRS, 2009, p. 
17)—again showing uncertain reliability, accuracy, and data validity. Even FEMA admits 
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that C2C, as a national capability assessment tool, is limited by the variations in the 
analytical skill levels across state and local users (GAO, 2008, p. 17). 
7. Comprehensive Assessment System 
Prior to the National Preparedness System, FEMA had concentrated its efforts on 
the Comprehensive Assessment System (CAS) as a mechanism for capabilities 
assessment. It is based on the five-step process of defining, collecting, analyzing, 
reporting, and improving preparedness data (GAO, 2010, p. 27). The CAS was designed 
to effectively assess prevention, response, and recovery capabilities, eliminate redundant 
data calls, reduce the burden on respondents, ensure the collection of meaningful data to 
guide policy and resource allocation decisions (OIG, 2010). To date, the CAS has not 
been implemented, due in large part to the revisions in HSPD 8 to PPD-8, the 
modifications in capabilities in the NIMS Training Plan (DHS, 2011c, p. v), and 
questions continue about how to collect the right information without placing undue 
burden on the states (OIG, 2008, p. 10). 
8. National Preparedness System 
The NPS attempts to integrate preparedness activities that have already been 
accomplished into a system that brings in new tools and processes to achieve outcomes 
necessary during emergencies and disasters. It builds on the efforts of the PKEMRA to 
form a six-step methodology to assist and enable states to collaborate approach across the 
whole community for national preparedness (FEMA, 2011d, p. 1). The six steps self-
assessment of the NPS process include the identifying and assessing risk, estimating 
capability needs, building and sustaining capabilities, developing a plan to deliver 
capabilities, validating capabilities, and the ongoing review and revision as the 
environment changes (FEMA, 2011d, pp. 2–6). The NPS correctly validates the 
capability needed by a risk assessment and necessitates the development of capabilities or 
sustainment of current capabilities. It guides states to develop a strategy to deliver 
capabilities through a collaborative, holistic process, rather than the vertical integration 
homeland security organizations have traveled previously. Each state would then 
aggregate the results of their Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 
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(THIRA) to the regional and then national level. The NPS is a quantum leap forward for 
FEMA in the development of a long-term approach to preparedness; however, the system 
has not been fully developed at this point, and, like the SPRS, may be subject to revision 
without consistency. 
9. Analysis of DHS Assessment Systems 
The measurement of relatively small pieces of homeland security overall might be 
accomplished in straightforward methods. As soon as an attempt is made to aggregate or 
integrate relationships among the various parts of the enterprise, however, the 
conclusions become unreliable and suspect (White Paper, 2010). Furthermore, these 
evaluation efforts are based on self-assessment, leading to inconsistent results and often 
to intense political debates. It is extremely difficult to measure nebulous questions, such 
as “Are we more secure?” and “Are we better prepared?” 
Based on the capability that has been developed and the results of response to real 
world events, one can observe the outcomes that support resilience. The consortium 
stipulates that homeland security performance can and should be measured, but not in the 
conventional ways other less complex government programs are measured (White Paper, 
2010). Homeland security performance might look more like the results we expect to see 
from national security measurements, as in collaboration, partnering, and forward-leaning 
(Blair, 2009, pp. 8–10), rather than, for example, measurements of emergency service 
outputs (e.g., response times to incidents). The outcomes we select to measure homeland 
security must come from the priorities of our communities and strategic national 
priorities, not solely those of the homeland security government sector (White Paper, 
2010). 
C. PRIVATE SECTOR ASSESSMENT SYSTEMS 
Although less than 10 years in making, the homeland security experience has yet 
to develop an assessment system that provides measurable results. The private sector 
utilizes three successful performance assessment and improvement systems—Total 
Quality Management, Six Sigma, and the BSC. The focus of private sector systems is on 
both the customer and the bottom line—combining performance with customer value. 
29 
 
With the loss of either, the company will no longer be able to maintain operations and 
will fail. 
1. Total Quality Management 
Total Quality Management (TQM) was developed by W. Edwards Deming in the 
post-World War II reconstruction period in Japan. It ushered in a management 
philosophy that believed that quality and productivity would increase by concentrating on 
the people that perform the tasks, involving them in the process improvements, and 
building long-term relationships with suppliers (Cohen, 2009). Deming developed 14 
points for management. At first sight, they appear to be a jumble of radical ideas, but the 
key to understanding a number of them lies in Deming’s thoughts about variation. He felt 
that variation led to waste and poor performance (Deming, 1986, p. 20). Deming believed 
that performance improvement was a continuous process, accomplished with proactive 
teams of employees. This management philosophy focused on the long-term survival of 
an organization (Brocka and Brocka, 1992, p. 5). 
When TQM was introduced, it was a break from the contemporary management 
philosophy of the time by concentrating on people rather than productivity and by having 
customer-focused organizations involving their employees in the continuous 
improvement process. TQM uses strategy, data, and effective communication to integrate 
the quality principles into the organization’s culture and activities into a problem-solving 
cycle (Hackman and Wageman, 1995, p. 2). TQM is based on eight organizationally 
interwoven principles depicted in Figure 1. 
 
 






TQM supports the assertion that performance improvement or quality 
improvement is equally based on quantitative data, process, and training, as it is with 
qualitative leadership, relationships (internal and external) and culture. It further supports 
the notion that a holistic strategy involving all stakeholders, internal and external, is the 
key to success (TQM, 1996, p. 4). In TQM, however, product quality is given higher 
priority than intangible results and focuses on variation in prescribed processes. If TQM 
works well with a fixed set of process parameters and the reduction of variation in those 
parameters, it is not suited for nor would it be effective in the no-notice, rapidly evolving, 
and adaptive threats in the homeland security environment. 
2. Six Sigma 
Six Sigma is a management strategy not unlike TQM, which stresses quality 
improvement in processes; however, it strives for zero defects in production. Six Sigma 
was originally developed by Motorola, deriving its name from an organizational goal of 
reducing defects to a margin of six standard deviations (utilizing the Greek letter “Σ/σ” as 
one standard deviation) from the production mean. The strategy included an 
organization’s development of subject matter experts (SME) trained in Six Sigma for 
people development (DFSS, 2002, p. 7), but it focused on process improvement. 
3. Balanced Scorecard 
The BSC has been used successfully by the private sector for measuring 
performance; it defines a measurement tool for financial and customer results, operations, 
and organizational capacity (Niven, 2003, p. 4). Developed in the early 1990s, the BSC 
provided a look at the results of operations (qualitative) in the form of customer 
satisfaction and the analytic benchmarks (quantitative) in the form of financial returns 
(Kaplan and Norton, 1992, p. 73). It also was designed to measure non-financial 
performance; align vision and mission with customer requirements and day-to-day work; 
manage and evaluate business strategy; monitor operation efficiency improvements; build 
organization capacity; and communicates progress to all employees (Rohm, 2002, p.1). 
The BSC balances the key organizational parameters, operations, capacity, and results 
into a dynamic assessment system. 
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While strategy has different meanings in different contexts, Niven defines 
strategy as the broad priorities adopted by an organization in recognition of its operating 
environment and in pursuit of its mission (2005, p. 130). Strategy provides alignment 
between day-to-day actions (means) and the vision (ends) of the organization (Nickols, 
2003, p. 8). The BSC originally was developed for the private sector; however, it has 
been successfully adapted for government and nonprofit organizations. For example, in 
2004 and then again in 2008, the City of Charlotte, North Carolina, was an early 
governmental adopter and successfully used the BSC. The City of Charlotte used the 
BSC to define performance management, emphasize strategy, and as a forward-looking 
mechanism to translate strategy into tangible, measurable objectives (Schumacher, 2008, 
p. 4) as opposed to simply reporting data. Instead of a public sector organization 
attempting to meet all requests—that is, “being all things, to all situations”—it prioritizes 
actions and provides direction for the organization. 
Furthermore, Bryson asserts that developing organization-wide and departmental 
balanced scorecards increases effectiveness of meeting its mandates, fulfilling its 
mission, and creating public value (2004, p. 55). It provides a comprehensive view of 
performance against plan by offering a balance between short- and long-term objectives, 
between desired outcomes and performance drivers, and between “hard” and “soft” 
objective measures (Whittaker, 2003, p. 4). The development of public value is 
paramount for the long-term existence and sustainment of public organizations, and it is 
created when an organization can demonstrate accountability for the funding provided by 
generating outcomes that matter to its stakeholders. Never before have outcomes 
mattered so much to government and nonprofit organizations as they do today (Niven, 
2005, p. 39). 
4. Analysis of Private Sector Assessment Systems 
In the analysis of private sector assessment tools there is no doubt that 
performance is a primary influencing factor. There is relevance to the performance of the 
emergency management mission, and there are takeaways that can be useful. For example 
in TQM, focusing on the people that perform the tasks, involving them in the process 
improvements, and establishing relationships support the emergency management drivers 
32 
 
of performance. In Six Sigma, the emphasis on internal processes, development of in-
house subject matter experts, and focus on strategy are key considerations of a proposed 
assessment system. The BSC looks more broadly at the financial and non-financial 
perspectives of the organization, as well as the alignment of mission and vision, which 
results in alignment of focus areas and improved performance.  
However, complex and chaotic asymmetrical terrorist attacks and “maximum of 
maximum” emergency management events are characterized by a large numbers of 
interacting, cascading elements, and variables are rarely fixed. These interactions are 
nonlinear, where minor changes can produce disproportionately major cascading 
consequences (Snowden and Boone, 2007, p. 6). These events will rarely follow defined 
rules and often are characterized by limited time to analyze and deliberate options. These 
events call for emergent, novel thinking with a management system that is flexible, 
adaptable, and scalable. A performance system based on process and outputs alone will 
not support an emergency management assessment framework. There is considerable 
value in leveraging the experiences in private industry and tempering it with the emergent 
challenges in homeland security to form a method for assessing performance. 
Using Caudle’s assertion of the five relationships in the BSC, the homeland 
security balance scorecard must account for public stewardship, clientele impact, day-to-
day processes, human capital support, and enabling support. Public stewardship is the 
judicious use of public resources, such as program revenue, grants, and staff, to ensure 
results in the efficient manner that minimizes cost (Niven, 2005, p. 13). As further stated 
by Niven (2005, p. 14), clientele impact is how we appear to our customers, as well as the 
political leaders and the public. The key processes are those that an organization must 
excel at to continue to add value (Niven, 2005, p. 15). Investing in the human capital in 
the organization, creating subject matter experts, and improving skills promote the influx 
of new ideas and ensure process improvement. And finally, enabling support will develop 
and continue when stakeholders see the value—it’s the return on investment the 
organization delivers that will sustain the enterprise. 
These five relationships are interdependent and linked through strategy (Kaplan 
and Norton, 1996, p. 25), which aligns with the existence of organization (mission) and 
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the organizational direction (vision). Professor Caudle’s (2008) assertion concludes with 
an underlying question: What scorecard design and organizational factors can respond to 
the complexities of homeland security and emergency management delivery, partner 
relationships, and the responsibilities and resulting strategy agreement? What strategies 
have states used to measure performance and deliver value? The questions posed offer a 
place to begin the development of a framework that addresses performance of our 
preparedness activities. 
Summary 
The CBP strategy served the emergency management mission space by providing 
the tools and benchmarks necessary to meet the risks of all-hazards emergencies and the 
challenges of terrorism. The DHS supported these benchmarks with 37 target capabilities 
that were commonly considered necessary to respond effectively to disasters, and as a 
result, states adopted a capabilities-based strategy to build the necessary defenses to these 
challenge. A strategy based solely on capabilities will provide the platform that supports 
a community’s resilience, where in actuality, resilience is largely dependent on the real-
world performance individually and the impact those capabilities have collectively when 
disaster strikes. 
FEMA has been struggling to find a system to assess performance over time to 
show Congress the improvement made since 9/11. The FEMA-issued assessment systems 
have focused on a series of one-size-fits-all, self-assessment approaches at the state level 
to determine the level of national preparedness. Even the state-level assessments find 
difficulty in determining community-level disaster preparedness. In the analysis of 
private sector assessment tools, there is a focus on the bottom line performance as an 
important factor for survivability, but building customer value is equally important for 
sustainability. It is also true that the development of public value is paramount for the 
long-term existence and sustainment of public organizations; it is created when an 
organization can demonstrate accountability for the funding provided by generating 
outcomes that matter to its stakeholders. 
Therefore, a FEMA value-added assessment system must focus on the community 
and statewide impact of disaster response. It must also account for the support it receives 
through day-to-day processes and investments in its human capital through a strategy 
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based on outcomes. The binding strategy for this assessment system must deliver the 
outcomes we select to measure from the priorities of our communities and states that 
support their resilience in the aftermath of disaster, with an eye on the national strategic 
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III. SYNTHESIS OF AN OUTCOMES MODEL 
From the literature on assessment systems, both governmental and business, 
Section III will explore the goal of preparedness: outcomes that support state-specific and 
national resilience. Based on the preparedness question and an outcomes end state, a 
model will begin to emerge using an outcomes logic model discovered in the research. 
The essential components of the outcomes logic model are inputs, processes, outputs, and 
impacts. These essential components will be further fleshed out using successes that are 
anecdotally known to be effective in emergency management and homeland security. 
Reaching back to the Balanced Scorecard as an assessment and performance system and 
combining it with the outcomes logic model, a framework emerges that may answer the 
national preparedness question. 
The new framework becomes a predictive model to assess a statewide 
preparedness and has the potential to provide a national view of preparedness. However, 
conventional assessment of quantitative analyses must be balanced with an equally 
rigorous qualitative assessment as well; management activities and outputs achieved are 
equally balanced with emergent leadership and the impacts it delivers to accomplish 
statewide preparedness. The framework also includes the importance and reliance on 
strategy to realize the national preparedness vision. 
After an organization identifies strategic goals and develops plans to accomplish 
them, the next step is to organize the enterprise for success. An organizational model or 
framework must be developed that brings the moving parts into a synchronized effort. To 
begin the process of developing such a model for emergency management that gauges 
performance, one must explore the factors that are commonly found in successful 
programs and build upon them. An outcomes-oriented logic model is a good starting 
point since it describes the linkage between planned activities and expected outcomes. 
Using a logic model demonstrates how an activity or set of related activities are projected 
[or predicted] to cause an outcome or set of outcomes (Westbrook and Murphy, 2009). 
Many evaluation experts agree that use of the logic model is an effective way to ensure 
program success. Using a logic model throughout a program helps organize and 
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systematize program planning, management, and evaluation functions (Kellogg 
Foundation, 2004, p. 5). The benefits of an outcomes logic model are: 
 
• Identifies strategic goals that are intended in planning; 
• Identifies what specific activities will produce specific outcomes; 
• Identifies an overarching vision in short-, intermediate- and long-term goals; 
• Identifies stakeholder value that the model is intended to attain; and 
• Identifies the factors that positively or negatively influence the outcomes 
predicted (Kellogg, 2004, Westbrook and Murphy, 2009).  
Figure 2 serves as a conceptual framework identifying the common relationships between 
the factors in an outcomes-oriented logic model. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Outcomes Logic Model (After Greenfield et.al., 2006, p. 4) 
Successes within the components of the model are often gauged by benchmarks 
based on best practices; until recently, however, the homeland security journey has 
advocated a “one-size-fits-all” approach that is impossible and impractical to attempt to 
achieve. Some (Bauer, 2009, p. and Stigler, 2010, p. 78) have called for a modification in 
the NIMS ICS to work in other circumstances where the national model does not. One 
can argue that these practices are instead smart practices that have been adapted to one’s 
environment where they become useful. Bardach (2005, p. 1) suggests that there is a 
misrepresentation of best practices, that “rarely will you have any confidence that some 
helpful-looking practice is actually the ‘best’ among all those that are addressed to the 
same problem or opportunity.” He suggests that “smart practices” rely on resourceful 
collaboration, innovation and initiative, and have an added value of gaining something 
“on the cheap.” The performance logic model is one of those smart practices that are used 
both by the private sector and increasingly by governmental and nonprofit organizations. 
The following sections will look at these factors in the outcomes logic model—inputs, 
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processes, outputs and impacts—as they relate to the emergency management 
environment. 
A. INPUTS 
Inputs are tangible and intangible materials that an organization takes in or 
develops to ultimately produce the products or services intended by the organization. 
Inputs can be tangible resources (i.e., people, funding, equipment, facilities, supplies); 
and in today’s technology-driven world, the importance of non-tangible resources (i.e., 
people’s ideas and time) has driven organizations. Inputs can also be major external 
forces that influence the organization and its programs, including, but not limited to, 
stakeholder needs, collaboration, legal mandates, political, and environmental 
considerations. Having the ideal inputs alone does not guarantee success, although it lays 
the value-added foundation to accomplish intended goals. 
The inputs that support a successful emergency management program are 
emphasized by human capital, organizational orientation, enabling support, and inter-
agency collaboration. Human capital responds to important interpersonal skills that 
include forward-leaning leadership, positive culture, customer focus, and communicating 
expectations. Organizational orientation enhances mission-vision strategy, learning-
adapting employees, performance-driven ideas, and political-legislative objectives. 
Operational support delivers risk-informed planning, capability development, 
standardization and interoperability, and readiness and reliability of resources in a 
comprehensive system. And finally, interagency cooperation enhances collaboration and 
partnering, operational networks, information sharing, and the holistic approach to 
emergency management. The following section will explore these inputs that have 
positively contributed to emergency management and the effect on short- and long-term 
results. 
1. People-Centered Organization 
People drive an organization in a particular direction; however, a unifying 
positive orientation drives in the mission-specific direction and achieves results that 
matter. Positive member orientation in emergency management is supported in three 
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critical areas: organizational culture, investing in knowledge capital, and purposeful 
hiring practices. Beyond developing positive member orientation is the degree of 
investment the members have in the leader. Leadership is not a competition for the hearts 
and minds of the organizational members; it is a collaborative contract and the level of 
credibility one entrusts in that leader. Combined, the internal strength of its members and 
the investment in its leader form the foundation needed to develop outcomes-oriented 
organizations.  
The degree of positive orientation an organization has is largely dependent on the 
culture within. One study found that organizational effectiveness was closely linked with 
organizational culture (Lee and Tseng, 2005, p. 161). While organizational culture is 
broadly defined by the attitudes, experiences, beliefs, and values of an entire 
organization, the degree of organizational traits, found in ambivalence, indifference, and 
upward mobility, determines the orientation of the employee. A separate study concludes 
that upwardly mobile orientations are positively associated with job satisfaction and 
motivation, but ambivalent and indifferent orientations are negatively associated with the 
same (McCroskey et al., 2005, p. 36). Simply stated, the studies conclude that the degree 
of investment the employee has in the organization and the leader, the greater tendency 
for the organization to produce positive outcomes. 
Successful organizations understand the critical cause-and-effect linkage between 
the investment in human capital and the development of subject matter experts. The 
results include improved thought, critical thinking skills, and adaptive innovation by the 
group—a key ingredient of an emergency management organization. Another way to 
enhance the workforce is to hire good people—people with the technical expertise and 
pragmatism to support the mission of the organization. Hiring the right people is the 
single most important business function that that an organization must perform 
deliberately. Infusing new thought processes and enthusiasm or advancing strategically-
oriented individuals from within has an immediate effect on the culture of the 
organization. 
Job satisfaction and motivation are also determined by the extent of credibility 
one entrusts and invests in the leader. Kouzes and Posner (2003, p. 13–14) tell us that 
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leaders must gain and maintain credibility with their constituents. They assert that people 
define a leader’s credibility by honesty, the degree of forward thinking, the level of 
competence, and how the constituent is inspired. One study evaluated the level of trust 
the member has in leadership. It shows a significant relationship to five important 
outcomes: job performance, organizational citizenship behaviors, intent to quit, 
organizational commitment, and job satisfaction (Dirks and Ferrin, 2000). Therefore, if it 
is people that move an organization, one can conclude that the extent of positive 
alignment of organization’s culture and the commitment of its members to the leader and 
the organization’s vision will be a key determinant for success. 
a. Decision-Making and Knowledge Capital 
First responders and emergency management professionals have 
historically relied on experience as a preferred quality in their leaders. Glen Woodbury, 
former Washington state emergency management director and Director at the Center for 
Homeland Defense and Security (Naval Postgraduate School), points out that 
“emergency management has customarily been a gathering of people from other 
disciplines, especially the military, fire and police services, who have retired from those 
services and are looking for their second career” (Holdeman, 2010). Experience is an 
integral factor with the recognition-primed decision making process used during 
complicated, stressful emergency management events. Experience is important to the 
stakeholders in the state and provides public confidence in our emergency management 
leaders. 
However, future emergency management leaders may be limited by the 
paradigms of their discipline, and as Kuhn points out, these discipline paradigms 
transform a group (1962, p. 19) and its assumptions about or methods to address future 
challenges. New assumptions (paradigms/theories) require the reconstruction of prior 
assumptions and the reevaluation of prior facts. This is difficult and time consuming to 
overcome, especially in a stressful event. It is also strongly resisted by the established 
community (1962, p. 6–7). When an individual’s background is grounded in the parochial 
school of thought, an individual may be constrained by the ability of traditional 
disciplines to apply normal problem solving methods to complex problems. Life-long, 
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well-rounded “out of the box” critical thinking skills have a place in emergency 
management. The notion of experience-exclusive hiring is increasingly being supplanted 
by career-minded, critical thinking individuals with formal education. 
Prior to 9/11, emergency management focus was on natural or accidental 
man-made disasters that were non-adaptive, in that there was a reasonable set of known 
variables. These disasters, by their nature, are low probability, high consequence events. 
Typically, they would initially overwhelm the capacity of the affected area: however they 
included known operational objectives for response and management life-saving actions, 
destruction to property, and protection of social, environmental, economic and political 
stability of the affected region (Pearce, 2000, p. 23) and a known set of variables. These 
challenges are met with a rubric of standard operational methods and effectively applied 
“good practices” that best achieves positive outcomes—in that one senses the problem, 
analyzes consequences and options, and applies the appropriate resources (See Figure 3, 
Kurtz and Snowden, 2003, p. 468). If the initial analysis underestimates the scope of the 
event or the initial response proves ineffective, then sending additional resources and 
repeating incident objectives would be a typical approach to eventually resolve the 
problem. 
 
Figure 3.  Cynfin Decision-making Framework (From Snowden and Boone, 2007, p. 4) 
Threats from terrorism are adaptive, where the adversary will poke at the 
system, adapt to the response, evolve through alliances, or change tactics seemingly 
without reason. This creates extreme complexity during the event—9/11 being a case-in-
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point. On that day, our traditional disaster definition did not prepare our political 
leadership and the response community for the new paradigm. Some decisions that day 
changed from complicated to complex, as with for example, the order to land all aircraft 
over U.S. skies; and some decisions from complex to chaotic, as with the political 
decision to have Air Force fighters fire on a passenger aircraft that was not responding 
and heading toward a perceived target—a decision that had multi-dimensional 
complexity and ramifications. 
A traditional method for addressing complicated problems is training, 
where one has the opportunity to test the solution against clear and measurable goals and 
objectives. However, training looks in the rearview mirror to develop decisions for the 
present situations—that is relying on recognition-primed decision making. What worked 
well (and not so well) in the past within a synchronous environment developed the 
necessary knowledge and skills; however, there are too many variables found in complex 
problems, and the cognitive thinking becomes overloaded (Senge, 1990, p. 365). Many of 
the problems we face today are increasingly becoming more complex due to 
interdependencies and self-organized criticality. The methods used to solve complicated 
problems will not work in the complex decision making environment. By using 
subconscious, tacit knowledge found in probing, sensing, and adaptation skills, we gain 
insight and emergent thinking. Subconscious training is better suited for the rapidly 
cascading, asynchronous environment during a disaster and the resulting decision making 
complexities needed. Today’s leader must intuitively realize when an event does not 
match the circumstances found in recognition-primed incident and adapt—the key move 
for leaders is to realize as quickly as possible that something is radically different. 
Learning organizations are better equipped to sense a unique event, identify the novelties, 
and react more quickly. 
b. The Learning Organization 
Learning organizations learn how to visualize solutions and 
collaboratively solve problems (Senge, 1990, p. 367), enabling these individuals to be 
better equipped to succeed in a rapidly changing environment. Emergency management 
should be seeking individuals who have the skills to recognize the differences outlined 
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here and have the flexibility and adaptability to change quickly. The discourse about our 
future emergency managers—a critically-educated career professional or a second career 
experienced responder—is without resolution. The goal should be to attract persons who 
improve organizational thought and possess the requisite critical and creative thinking 
skills required to meet the homeland security meta-challenges today and into the future. 
The goal should be to attract individuals who have the perception, adaptability, and 
resourcefulness in the face of the uncertainty in the asymmetrical environment.  
The very first order of business to create a learning organization is 
effective leadership, which is not based on a traditional hierarchy, but is rather a mix of 
different people from all levels of the system who lead in different ways (Senge 1996, p. 
36). Leadership is about making things happen, contingent on a context. Leaders may 
create change by playing a central role in the actual change process, or by creating an 
environment in which others are empowered to act (Ancona, 2005, p. 1). Learning 
organizations are skilled at five main activities: systematic problem solving, 
experimentation with new approaches, learning from their own experience and past 
history, learning from the experiences and best practices of others, and transferring 
knowledge quickly and efficiently throughout the organization (Garvin, 1993, p.2). 
Experience, formal education, and critical thinking are virtues of the learning 
organization, and it is the knowledge capital that an organization possesses that is many 
times greater than the physical assets it owns. The foundation of the learning organization 
is in hiring leaders who encourage organizational learning and seek ways to add value to 
the mission and own the future—no matter what the background and education of the 
individual. 
2. External Considerations 
a. Enabling Support 
For an emergency management program to evolve, it requires considerable 
political and legislative support. Status quo is an incredibly difficult force to overcome—
there is greater comfort with a system that is familiar, albeit inefficient and unsustainable, 
than there is with a system that reflects the realities of today’s homeland security and 
emergency management world. When faced with complex decisions, people tend to 
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accept the status quo, as reflected in the old adage, “When in doubt, do nothing.” Across 
a range of everyday decisions, there is a considerable tendency to maintain the status quo 
and refrain from acting (Fleming, Thomas, and Dolan, 2010). The problem with status 
quo in emergency management is that social, political, and policy environments are 
changing, so capability, capacity, and decision-making must be equally adaptable and 
flexible to meet these demands. Noted earlier, one such recent policy change is PPD-8. It 
outlines the five mission areas of national preparedness—prevention, protection, 
mitigation, response, and recovery—rather than the previous four. In each of these 
mission areas are core capabilities, which are distinct, critical elements necessary to 
achieve the NPG (NPG, 2011, p. A-1). An emergency management organization must be 
oriented toward developing these 31 core capabilities; however, it has to adapt to the 
national policy change within the confines of the current state legislative and fiscal 
boundaries. 
An emergency management program is founded in its statutorily-based 
enabling language. Ongoing review of that language and legislative support paves the 
way through the legal obstacles to fulfilling its ever-changing mission; it breaks down 
barriers to creating a seamless coordination and response system. Providing situational 
awareness and maintaining dialogue with the executive and legislative branches of 
government will enhance the support needed for that ongoing review and revision. One 
such revision many states are working on is a cross-border mutual assistance system. 
Even though every state and most territories are participants and have statutory language 
for the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), many states are 
enhancing their day-to-day mutual aid needs through multi-state mechanisms to permit 
mutual aid across state lines that do not rise to a major disaster level. Several Midwestern 
states will be enacting legislation to permit participation in the Mid America Mutual Aid 
Consortium, allowing response and training below the EMAC at the local level. The 
legislation addresses such issues as worker’s compensation, tort immunity, training 
standards, and licensure at the local level. Having worked these concerns out ahead of 




b. Regional Collaboration and Partnering   
Homeland security professionals intrinsically value the developing 
relationships and often point to those relationships as a key factor contributing to the 
success of an emergency incident. Regional coordination refers to the use of 
governmental resources in a complementary way toward goals and objectives that are 
mutually agreed upon by various stakeholders in a region (GAO, 2004, p. 8). Regionally 
collaborative approaches in government have long been heralded as a preferred method 
of working more effectively and efficiently. The common wisdom of emergency 
management is that communication and collaboration are facilitated by personal 
familiarity, not just institutional contact (Waugh and Streib 2006, pp. 136–37). 
Anecdotally, emergency managers realize that true educational value comes more from 
the relationships developed and the information and smart practices exchanged outside of 
the classroom than from the formal educational experience itself. 
The present literature emphasizes efforts that support resiliency, and 
regional partnerships further support, define, and articulate a common mission and 
decision-making predicated on specific, high-level regional partnership outcomes or 
priorities (Caudle, 2006, p. 6). An example can be found in the preparedness plan 
developed by the National Capital Region, where it concentrates on interoperable 
communications, information sharing and situational awareness, critical infrastructure 
protection, and development and maintenance of regional core capabilities (NCR 
Strategic Plan, 2010, p.1). Regional response networks with risk management decisions 
made by homeland security partners must account for interdependencies across sectors 
and jurisdictions (QHSR, 2010, p. 42), which exceeds the decision platform of a 
capabilities-based planning process. Regional networks are a component of a robust 
emergency management response system—regional networks aggregate capacity for the 
mutual benefit of the individual constituent partners. State-based regional programs focus 
on ensuring that states are prepared to sustain themselves during a meta-scenario 
emergency event. Through regional programs, states learn the capabilities of their 
partnering states and quickly tap or merge resources as needed (Rhodes and Carafano, 
2006). “Frankly it’s in the state government’s best interest to make sure that there is a 
network of strong local government emergency management relationships,” said Randy 
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Duncan, chair of the International Association of Emergency Managers U.S. Government 
Affairs Committee (Pittman, 2011a). 
Aside from the strategic advantage of working together toward common 
goals, regional collaboration and partnering serve a qualitative component of the 
preparedness, such as problem-solving and sharing smart practices, that cannot be 
measured. State-based regional programs work collectively and cooperatively to focus on 
readiness and response to disasters. The 9/11 Commission Report (2004, p. 314) pointed 
to the success of the multi-agency Pentagon response, citing three critical points for the 
positive result: 
• Strong professional relationships and trust established among 
emergency responders 
• Adoption of the Incident Command System 
• Pursuit of a regional approach to response 
The Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD 5) identifies steps 
for improved coordination in response to incidents. The HSPD 5 serves to enhance the 
ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents by establishing a single, 
comprehensive national incident management system (HSPD 5, 2003). In HSPD 5, 
“engaged partnerships” are clearly a means to effective coordination of disaster 
operations, and the DHS has acknowledged its importance. Since 2008, DHS has placed 
an emphasis on the development of initiatives that enhance regional cooperation and 
coordination. The problem remains that while it is intuitively known that regional 
collaboration or partnering does support preparedness and response, the absence of 
measurement models is problematic for the advancement of interagency collaboration 
(Hovecar, 2000, p. 273). However, regional interagency collaboration and partnering 
cannot be ignored as a qualitative component of preparedness and must be factored into 
the preparedness question. Knowing one’s response partners ahead of an emergency 
consistently results in preferred outcomes. Regional partnering enhances commitment 
toward operational capacity, cooperative goals, and common operating picture necessary 
in a meta-disciplinary environment. The aggregated effect of regional partnering is not 
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easily measured in quantitative terms, and it may not be fully realized until the 
emergency has occurred—where the real value of these relationships truly emerges.  
Building relationships by statewide local emergency managers is critical 
to ensuring the best outcomes when an emergency strikes (Pittman, 2011). Furthermore, 
Clovis asserts that “the aggregation methodology does not stop at the state level. For 
states to meet their regional needs, they must “seek mutual support agreements that 
provide solutions more appropriate to the consumer-voters” (Clovis, 2006, p. 17). One 
such example is the Mutual Aid Box Alarm System. It is a grassroots fire, hazmat, EMS, 
and technical rescue services system that is founded on the neighbor helping neighbor 
ethic—that has grown into an agreement between seven participating states. The services 
are at no cost to the receiving state, other than consumable items. The system works for 
the member states, but it may not for all states. This is yet another example of a unique 
regional, state, or local-level approach to preparedness that is counter to the federal top-
down push of compliance objectives and national planning scenarios; and it remains 
unexplained in a top-down, one-size-fits-all system of performance measurement 
advocated by the federal government. 
c. Role of Standardization.   
Communication limitations and interoperability between responders on 
September 11 have been well-chronicled. There was a lack of information exchange 
between the working crews inside the Twin Towers and the observations made outside 
about the structural integrity of the building (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 298), and the 
command posts of the law enforcement agencies and the fire department. There were 
further communications difficulties with the overloaded and compromised system being 
used (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 299). Besides the problems encountered during a large-
scale response within a single agency, in mutual aid problems can expand to include 
equipment and systems, procedures and protocols, environmental conditions and culture. 
Along with these construct problems, training, licensing, and qualification of responding 
personnel make incident objectives difficult to achieve. Therefore, a standardized 
approach to response is necessary to order needed resources and ensure interoperability; 
the NIMS and the NRF addresses this need and view standardization as an imperative. 
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One method of standardization is to develop capabilities that are 
preplanned, qualified, ready to respond, and have a defined mission capability. Mission-
ready packages (MRPs) serve the resource needs for everyday emergencies and during 
major disaster responses. The National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) 
has advocated for the use of MRPs for large-scale events using the Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC); however, having pre-determined mutual 
assistance from neighboring communities is a strong component of daily responses that 
exhaust local capacity. At the statewide level, it is imperative to have these local systems 
networked to serve as the foundation of an intrastate mutual aid system and the resources 
from which to make up the EMAC MRP. MRPs make response and recovery capabilities 
more readily identified, more easily deployed, and more effectively used (NEMA, 2011, 
p. 43). 
As directed by President Bush in HSPD-5, Secretary Tom Ridge of the 
newly formed Department of Homeland Security rolled out a consistent nationwide 
approach to federal, state, local, and tribal governments to work effectively and 
efficiently to prepare for, prevent, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, 
regardless of cause, size, or complexity (The White House, 2003a). In 2004, the National 
Incident Management System became that national, unifying, standardized approach for 
managing incidents at all levels. The NIMS includes a core set of concepts that 
standardizes terminology, technology, and coordination covering the incident command 
system (ICS). The ICS includes standardized training, classification of resources, 
qualifications, and the collection, tracking, and reporting of incident information. The 
NIMS and the ICS form the interoperability that was lacking on 9/11 (NIMS, 2004, p. 2). 
Emergency management must also use standards as a method to measure 
the organizational effectiveness of the enterprise against metrics that deliver outcomes 
that are meaningful to the people they serve. It answers the question: Is the organization 
“doing things right” by meeting national goals, while meeting the needs of its 
constituents? The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) has developed this 
standard to establish a common set of criteria for all hazards disaster/emergency 
management and business continuity programs. It provides the fundamental criteria to 
develop, implement, assess, and maintain the program for prevention, mitigation, 
49 
 
preparedness, response, continuity, and recovery. The standard applies not only to public 
sector, but also not-for profit, non-governmental organizations (NGO), and private 
entities on a local, regional, national, international, and global basis (NFPA 1600, 2010, 
p. 5). 
The National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) has 
developed a voluntary self-assessment and peer-assessment system called the Emergency 
Management Accreditation Program (EMAP). EMAP prepares organizations for and 
carrying out of all emergency functions to minimize injury and to repair damage resulting 
from natural, technological, and human-caused emergencies and disasters. EMAP defines 
“emergency management” in the broadest sense, meaning it encompasses all 
organizations with emergency/disaster functions in a jurisdiction, rather than only one 
agency or department. This system includes organizations involved in prevention of, 
mitigation against, preparedness for, response to, and recovery from disasters or 
emergencies. The process not only establishes the minimum acceptable performance 
criteria for an emergency management program, but also establishes a means for strategic 
improvement (EMAP, 2013, p. 1). 
d. Communication  
Communication challenges in the emergency management environment 
exist beyond incident response; they also include steady-state communication aimed at 
building partner relationships, developing strategies, and promoting cooperation between 
response agencies. During an emergency, there are three essential types of information 
that need to be conveyed. First, there is the information that goes to the public to provide 
an understanding of the event, personal safety and self-help information, and knowledge 
about the response effort. Additionally, there is information provided to the executive and 
legislative leadership to convey detail about the specifics of the response and recovery 
efforts. The third area is the internal information to the response partners, providing a 
common understanding of the collective and coordinated efforts to bring the event under 
control and to a successful conclusion. 
It is important to keep the executive and legislative leadership informed of 
the situation. Proactive executive disaster declarations locally and statewide, forward 
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leaning deployment of needed resources, and rumor control are some important reasons 
to have state and local leadership engaged and involved in the message to the public. A 
clear, concise, and coordinated message will better manage the response and recovery 
effort, and the public reaction to those disastrous events. As a part of regular emergency 
management crisis communications, supporting the state’s governor with timely and 
accurate information for delivery to the media is an imperative for reassuring the public 
during the response and assisting communities in the recovery effort. 
The third area is internal communication to the response partners through 
the dissemination of incident action plans, development of situational reports, and 
coordination from a common operating picture. When developing situational awareness, 
the goal is to paint a picture for those who will make critical decisions at the strategic 
level. Initial reports are often incomplete and, at times, inaccurate since early field-level 
size up is limited in scope when access is restricted or reported through discipline-
specific sources.  Radio traffic is often times inundated with the life and property 
priorities, and public service communication systems become overloaded and are subject 
to failure. However, as the incident unfolds that common operating picture must be 
developed by subsequent reports requiring additional detail that comes from critical 
thinking about the next steps, anticipation of resource needs.  Emergency managers must 
exercise “professional curiosity” about the event based on experience and the 
connectedness and fusion of information pieces (Personal communication with Maj. Gen. 
Donald Dunbar, September 2, 2011).  The speed of which to develop the common 
operating picture leads to optimal resource management initially for life safety needs and 
ultimately for the resilience of the affected community. 
Emergency managers must think ahead to gaps and needs not only in the 
response, but ahead to the recovery; consideration and planning should be given to 
changing weather conditions, cascading events, effects on critical infrastructure, and 
reactions to and effects on the public. To make these important decisions, it is imperative 
that emergency management organizations use a common operating platform through a 
web-based, virtual emergency operations center (EOC) to connect responding agencies 
and to coordinate incident priorities. Many states have virtual EOC’s (e.g., E-sponder, 
EMNet and Web EOC), which post status information and significant events on local 
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activities (e.g., utility outages, current incident actions, and future incident action plans). 
Of the five principles of the national response doctrine, two of them—engaged partners 
and unity of effort—support the need for enhanced, collaborative, and coordinated 
communications. It must also include the public.  
e. Public Information, Education, and Responsibility   
Advanced public information and timely emergency messaging during an 
event will result in better outcomes. It is predicated on pre-incident planning, 
development of multiple communication avenues, and establishing relationships with the 
media. Northern Illinois University had a plan in place for communicating emergency 
information—it was developed in the wake of the Virginia Tech campus shooting. They 
understood the importance of immediate notification through a direct chain of command, 
rather than waiting for a crisis team to be established (Peters, 2010, p. B-24). 
Communicating early to the public provides the best opportunity to avoid cascading 
events, greatly assists the response efforts, and enhances preferred outcomes. The City of 
Joplin successfully used both traditional mechanisms and social media to communicate 
emergency information to the public and conduct outreach to support long-term recovery 
(FEMA, 2011a, p. 16). Press briefings and conferences can serve multiple purposes 
beyond the obvious one of disseminating information to the media. Some other purposes 
include calming fears of the community, educating the public, asking residents for tips, 
communicating with suspects, and even communicating with responders (Murphy et al., 
2004, p. 93) when planned communication systems fail. 
Providing timely information must be supported by the knowledge of how 
one should react with the information provided. FEMA and most states and territories, as 
well as many counties and municipalities, have developed Internet-based information 
resources in the form of the Ready.gov sites. These websites offer preparedness 
information for children, families, businesses, and specific needs of local and county 
governments, and how to get involved in community preparedness (FEMA, 2012). 
However, emergency managers cannot rely solely on passive information sources; the 
preparedness message must also be taken to the public. One such program focuses efforts 
on elementary school students to create the preparedness responsibility, called Student 
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Tools for Emergency Planning (STEP). The STEP program is an emergency 
preparedness education project developed by FEMA and the American Red Cross that 
was piloted in 2008 in six New England states. Students at the 4th, 5th, and 6th grade 
levels are armed with strategies for dealing with various types of emergencies and will 
share this awareness with family members. In 2012–13 school year, Wisconsin will have 
over 10,000 students in more than 270 classrooms enrolled across the state (ReadyWI, 
2012). To create a culture of preparedness in the community beyond these programs, 
emergency management public education and messaging must also instill a sense of 
public responsibility during disasters. 
Emergency management cannot be “all things to all situations” and 
therefore must be horizontally integrated with partners that are not only with the 
traditional non-profit organizations, but also organizations in the private sector and the 
faith-based community. Furthermore, these partnerships play a key role in the community 
during a disaster by taking responsibility for self-help and preservation during an incident 
in light of the demands placed on responders. Emergency preparedness is also a public 
responsibility, and the emergency management should deliver programs that support the 
notion of shared responsibility—that is, the public’s preparedness “response” and 
“ability” to react properly. With programs such as STEP and information resources in the 
Ready.gov that states deliver, public messages can be effectively developed and delivered 
during the steady state and emphasized and acted upon during the emergency. 
The steady state provides the opportunity to communicate intended goals 
to the response partners and manage expectations the public has during a disaster. 
Communication, both internally and externally, is the binding element of a holistic 
approach to the response and recovery effort, and to positive outcomes. While the 
number of visits to a website, contacts made, and the number students enrolled in a 
program can be a measureable output of funding and staff allocation, the impact of these 





The steady state also provides an opportunity to improve processes by which 
inputs are used in the most-efficient and effective way possible. It provides a mechanism 
for improvement. Processes or organizational activities are used by an organization to 
process inputs and resources to produce intended outputs and impacts intended by the 
organization. A process is no more than a series of steps and decisions involved in the 
way work is accomplished (DoN, 1990). Process can range from something binary as 
resource inventory to as complex as risk management and development of operational 
capability based on the consequence of the risk. Other less tangible processes are aimed 
at avoiding, preventing, and reducing problems before they happen. In the sections ahead, 
some of the critical processes—risk management, mitigation planning, gap analysis, 
education and training—are reviewed as they relate to assessing and enhancing the 
performance of the emergency management system. 
1. Risk Management 
a. Risk Management Process   
The homeland security lexicon identifies risk as potential for an unwanted 
outcome resulting from an incident, event, or occurrence, as determined by its likelihood 
and the associated consequences (Lexicon, 2010, p. 24); risk management is a process by 
which risk is identified, and prevention and resistance measures are taken (or acceptance 
of risk). Local and statewide mitigation planning is a continuous improvement process 
for risk prevention in our communities. Risk analyses have been used to manage, build, 
and right-size resources and capabilities. They have been used to determine funding 
allocations for removal of structures in floodplains, place hazardous materials assets, and 
strengthen earthen dams. Risk assessment in emergency management is a process based 
on standards that can be found in NFPA 1600 (2007, p. 5) and the Emergency 
Management Accreditation Program (EMAP, 2010). 
Hazard identification and disaster mitigation planning have been part of 
emergency management hazard-risk assessments across the country for many years. 
Section 322 of the Disaster Mitigation Act establishes a requirement for states to have a 
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hazard mitigation plan. To receive federal mitigation funds and certain other disaster 
assistance, states must develop and submit for approval to FEMA a standard hazard 
mitigation plan that includes details of the planning process, the state’s natural hazards, 
risk assessment for the identified natural hazards, a mitigation strategy, and a plan 
maintenance process (State of Wisconsin, 2008, p. 1–4). Risk assessments made in the 
pre-1990 era were primarily threats from natural disasters and man-made accidents; 
global threats were part of a national security policy that was outside the lane of 
emergency management. 
Dating back to 1980 with the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), commonly known as Superfund, and later 
with the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), emergency 
management planners have undertaken hazard and risk planning (Superfund, 1986). Out 
of the Bhopal, India, methyl iso-cyanate release that killed 4,000 and permanently injured 
countless others brought the Emergency Planning Community Right-to-know Act 
(EPCRA) in 1986. EPCRA was passed in response to concerns regarding the 
environmental and safety hazards posed by the storage and handling of toxic chemicals 
(EPA-EM, 2011a). Regular reporting and off-site emergency planning have been 
performed by Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPC) for understanding 
chemical hazards in the community, developing emergency plans in case of an accidental 
release, and looking for ways to prevent chemical accidents (EPA-EM, 2011b). 9/11 
brought a new element into this risk management and planning equation. 
Complex, chaotic, and cascading events, brought about by 
interdependencies and asymmetrical attacks, have ushered in a new realm of planning in 
emergency management. The difference is active versus passive planning. Planning a 
60% solution early knowing the gaps is better than waiting for the 100% solution later 
when the critical event is at one’s doorstep. Beginning the journey by addressing gaps 
found in the unexpected twists and uncertainties will place the organization in a better 
position to address future challenges. Think of risk planning as a cycle as opposed to an 
end state; the plan must be a living document on a regular cycle of improvement—
improvement that will be revealed in regular assessments of the environment, risk 
analysis, planned exercises, and real-life events. 
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b. Risk Assessment   
The post-9/11 risk environment is not only from natural and man-caused 
disasters; it is from acts of terrorism. It is from an enemy that is probing, adaptive, and 
patient. The analysis must therefore also be adaptive and be proactive to meet the 
changing environment. So too, emergency management planning must also include this 
non-traditional threat and have the capability, capacity, and coordination to effectively 
address these catastrophic events. Rather than rigid approaches that apply only in certain 
scenarios when specific assumptions are true, a focus on capabilities will enable 
integrated, flexible, and agile all-hazards efforts tailored to what we know are unique 
circumstances of any given threat, hazard, or actual event. 
The current federal and state programs in place should be merged to build 
unity of effort and a common strategic understanding among all the partners (NFPA, 
2007, pp. 5–6), so FEMA can identify the top threats and hazards facing the country and 
the consequences of those threats and hazards should they occur. Existing state hazard 
mitigation processes and Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) assessments could serve 
as potential models upon which to base this statewide threat and hazard risk assessment 
process. The statewide risk assessment would be aggregated within each FEMA Region 
to develop the regional risk picture (Task Force, 2010, p. 37). Once developed, the risk 
assessment process would be a tool for organizations at all levels of government to 
identify, assess, and prioritize their natural and man-made risks (FEMA, 2011b) and 
focus on capabilities necessary to address those events to pose the greatest risk to a state. 
The value of these assessment systems to emergency management is the 
process that facilitates the identification of needed capability and the resource gaps that 
must be filled. Performed collectively, the process builds a shared perspective for strategy 
development and decision-making around risk. It is from that common assessment picture 
that emergency management will be able to track their year-to-year progress toward 
closing the gaps and assure sufficient operational capability, capacity, and reliability for a 
major disaster. To keep the risk assessments from becoming overburdening to state, 
tribal, and local organizations, the process should begin by leveraging existing hazard 
mitigation work and GIS data already in use. However, it should be conducted in a 
56 
 
standardized manner to make aggregated results meaningful in a federal assessment 
system. Under PPD-8, the proposed national Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk 
Assessment (THIRA) process under development is currently awaiting the completion of 
the statewide and regional assessments. The result will hopefully provide a national 
identification and implementation plan, and the answer to the preparedness question 
Congress is seeking. 
In 1999, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
developed a comprehensive Community Vulnerability Assessment Tool (CVAT) that 
now has been updated and is called the Roadmap for Coastal Risk. The previous CVAT 
can provide a basis for the homeland security THIRA since it is based in a methodology 
for state and local governments to conduct community-wide vulnerability assessments to 
a range of hazards. It would not, however, specifically address climate change (NOAA, 
2011). The CVAT focuses on mitigation outcomes, and it addresses community-wide 
issues with multiple disciplines; it assesses the potential for long-term impacts and 
provides a foundation to develop sustainable solutions (Bender, 2002, p. 137, Green, 
2003, p. 3). According to the CVAT, the following are the seven major areas of 
consideration for benchmarking community preparedness:  
Hazard Identification 
Hazard-Risk Analysis 




Mitigation Opportunities Analysis 
The development of the Strategic National Risk Assessment is an 
important first step in moving the risk analysis forward and determining the capability 
needed to address it. However, further analysis at the regional and community level will 
help communities better understand their risks and form a foundation for their own 
security and resilience (DHS, 2011d, p. 7). 
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The THIRA process identifies the threats that pose the greatest harm to 
our states and our Nation, understanding that it may be defined differently based on state 
and local challenges and environments. Therefore, assessments and performance 
requirements are unique based on those differences. The state and local THIRA 
assessment called for today is currently under development, but eventually all the 
THIRAs will be aggregated into a national assessment called for in the Strategic National 
Risk Assessment under PPD-8. John Madden, who chairs the Mitigation Committee for 
the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) and a member of the PPD-8 
Committee, said the mitigation influence will prevail throughout the five focus areas of 
PPD-8 (personal conversation at NEMA’s 2011 EM Policy & Leadership Forum on 
October 5, 2011). Future mitigation will not just include traditional prevention, 
protection, and avoidance measures, but efforts toward educational awareness and 
proactive approaches to engage the whole community. 
c. Scope of Mitigation  
The negative effect that a disaster will have on a community will largely 
depend on the resilience of the community through its prevention efforts. To address 
prevention, states have established multi-hazard mitigation plans designed to assess their 
unique hazards, develop action plans, and take actions to mitigate those hazards. Hazard 
mitigation is an effective prevention tool, defined as any action taken to reduce the 
chance of a natural hazard from happening, or to reduce a natural hazard’s impact on 
people or property when it does happen (FEMA, 2010c). Anecdotally we know that every 
dollar spent on mitigation returns four dollars in cost avoidance. The old adage, “an 
ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure” certainly is a golden rule in emergency 
management mitigation since it focuses on reducing the effects of future disasters. 
The traditional approach to mitigation identifies activities that fall into 
various categories and priority levels, cover different geographic areas, and address 
different types of hazards. The organization, contents, and data in these plans are driven 
in part by the planning requirements developed by the FEMA and the hazards that have 
historically occurred in a state or region. Hazards can include major storms, flooding, 
dam breaks, extreme temperatures, and disease outbreaks. Hazard mitigation planning 
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helps communities to develop consensus around actions to reduce or eliminate the long-
term risk to human life, health, safety, and property from hazards (WI-HMP, 2008, p. 1–
3). FEMA has a software product that performs risk modeling called Hazus-MH. This 
software product is a nationally applicable standardized methodology that estimates 
potential losses from floods, earthquakes, and hurricane winds (FEMA, 2010c). It utilizes 
the multi-layered Geographical Information System (GIS) interface, which provides a 
visual look at the areas of risk with a number of layered information platforms. While the 
Hazus-MH is limited to a few disaster scenarios, it has the potential to expand into other 
uses (e.g., modeling risk during an incident in real time). The role of mitigation in 
emergency management has expanded beyond this narrow focus on community hazard 
reduction and future damage prevention. 
Today, mitigation has a much larger application. It is broadly defined as 
measures to protect and minimize threats to life and property, or lessen the impact of 
future disasters (NPG, 2011, p. 9). Mitigation in the PPD-8 plays a more encompassing 
role in that mitigation seizes opportunities for continuous improvement in the five 
mission areas of homeland security and seeks to remove barriers to strategic success. The 
NPG goal emphasizes the need to meet the threats with capabilities from wide-ranging 
sources that pose the greatest risk the nation—and mitigation reduces the consequences 
of those same risks. In this newly expanded scope, the core of mitigation remains on the 
community’s resilience and survival of its quality of life. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Scope of Mitigation (From NAFSMA, 2012, p. 10) 
59 
 
 Since mitigation delivers the greatest “bang for our buck,” why would 
mitigation be the first area for financially-stressed governments to eliminate? As stated 
by Michael Balboni, New York’s point man on preparedness in both Republican and 
Democratic administrations, “As your budget shrinks, the first thing that goes out the 
door is emergency management, the first thing (Gormley, 2012, p. 21A).” One needs only 
to take lessons from the levy system in Louisiana before Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and 
the rebuilding along the shore on the east coast with so called Superstorm Sandy in 2012 
to see the results of marginalizing mitigation. It takes considerable political will to place 
much-needed funding in a mitigation initiative when most people either never 
experienced a similar emergency or do not believe will ever happen to them, or when it 
limits economic development in an attractive area. Unfortunately, communities and 
elected officials have short-term memories and grander economic development plans, so 
the lessons learned during disasters become lessons observed that will be destined to 
repeat. However, healthy risk management programs take emergency management 
lessons from the process of identifying and mitigating risk, to the preparation to fill the 
gaps in capability and seize mitigation opportunities when they surface. It starts with the 
gap analysis and moves into long-term community planning. 
d. Gap Analysis and Capability Planning   
Capability-based planning will continue to be an important process in 
emergency management. The right capability and the sufficient capacity necessary to 
meet the scope of a disaster that is likely to affect a state. The 2011 release of the PPD-8 
seeks to move away from burdensome requirements of capability-based planning, and 
instead build the key (core) capabilities common to disaster events that the nation needs 
to confront any challenge. Brian Kamoie, senior director for preparedness policy on the 
White House National Security Staff, asserts that capabilities defined by specific and 
measurable objectives are the cornerstone of preparedness (Pittman, 2011b). 
2. Preparedness Process 
Based on the results of the THIRA process, an assessment of capability is 
required to meet the immediate actions to save lives, protect property and the 
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environment, and meet basic human needs. Response also includes the execution of 
emergency plans and actions to support short-term recovery (FEMA, 2008b, p. 1). The 
Gap Analysis Program is the method by which gaps are identified and a strategy 
developed to fill community and state-specific capabilities based on the new core 
capabilities found in PPD-8. Besides the THIRA and gap assessment, there are other 
emergency management functions that support resilience. 
a. Education, Training and Exercises   
Once the assessment, strategy development, and planning processes are 
complete, the education process begins. Education, training and exercises occur both 
externally and internally to the emergency management organization. The message 
externally should be prevention and self-help. During a major crisis or disaster, there will 
not be enough responders for every need, so educating the public, the business 
community, and potential volunteers ahead of time pays dividends during the event. 
These are force multipliers during the crisis phase of an incident.  
Public education and prevention programs are designed to change the 
dynamics and empower people during a disaster to becoming engaged and supportive of 
a better outcome. Ready.gov on the national level and states’ readiness programs and 
campaigns are designed to send succinct messages to the public: “Make a Kit, Develop a 
Plan, Keep Informed and Get Involved.” These are activities that are simple personal 
strategies for the general public to achieve. They follow the 3–3–30 Rule – that is that a 
crisis message should consist of three short sentences that convey three key messages in 
30 words or less. 
Internally to the emergency management organization, the key asset is the 
people within, and therefore investing in knowledge capital supports the management 
processes (i.e., THIRA) strategic and catastrophic planning, and developing situational 
awareness. Having a continuing education program develops the organization’s 
knowledge capital and enhances a continuous improvement program. It improves internal 
thought and public service as precursors to key management processes, and develops 
critical thinking skills during crisis management and mission leadership. Creating 
learning organizations is an important foundational ingredient for successful outcomes. 
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Many training educators understand the premise that skills are perishable 
and must be refreshed periodically. Training and exercising allow personnel to hone and 
reinforce those skills learned during low to moderate stress environments. An essential 
goal of emergency preparedness for a major emergency is that first responders be able to 
respond swiftly with well-planned, well-coordinated, and effective actions that save lives 
and property, mitigate the effects of the disaster, and set the stage for a quick, effective 
recovery (Jenkins, 2006, p. 4). The HSEEP process ensures that this goal is met and that 
gaps and lessons-learned transition to an improvement plan that can be tracked over time 
rather than repeated.  
C. OUTPUTS 
Outputs are usually the tangible goods and services produced by the major 
processes in the organization. Within this discussion, they are supporting measures and 
goals of an intended capability, and ultimately for the outcomes sought in national 
preparedness. According to Business Dictionary, output is a calculation, recording, or 
tabulation of the results of an activity, effort, or process that can be expressed in 
numbers—that is, quantitatively (BusinessDictionary, 2012). Outputs provide the metrics 
that Congress is looking for in answering the preparedness question: How prepared is the 
country to meet risk facing the nation? Outputs are frequently misunderstood as 
indicators of success of an organization or program, and are oftentimes wrongly used to 
determine it. 
For example, having a number of radios with common frequencies having the 
capability of interoperable communication alone does not manifest itself into 
communication interoperability. It takes a combination of ubiquitous equipment, a plan 
of action, training, and people accepting and embracing it to make it work. 
Interoperability must be defined in terms of who must communicate with whom, and only 
then will the outputs of true interoperability be evaluated. Does a line firefighter need to 
talk directly with a patrol officer? What interoperability is critical to operations and 
safety? Does every radio need to provide access to a thousand frequencies? It is not the 
equipment and the technology that fail in interoperability; it is people who fail to plan 
62 
 
strategically, define goals, practice in the real world, and participate in a holistic way that 
are the impediments to true success. 
1. Output Metrics 
The measure of outputs can be used to manage the effective use of inputs and the 
efficient development of processes, which determines whether an organization is working 
effectively and efficiently. Outputs can also be used as a determinant of fulfilling the 
mission by establishing measurable objectives that support strategic goals that ultimately 
support the mission of the organization. The areas that produce outputs and support 
strategic goals follows: 
• Risk Analysis and Gap Assessment 
• Vulnerability Reduction 
• Prevention and Preparedness Activities 
• Catastrophic Planning  
• Capability-building and Delivery 
• Training/Exercise 
• Benchmarking Standards 
• Continuity of Operations 
An emergency management output that delivers on a strategic benchmark is a state’s all-
hazards emergency response plan. The development of a plan begins as a process based 
on guidance found in the Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101; it is combined with 
the collaborative input expertise within the emergency management organization, 
response partners, and subject matter experts. Processing the plan requires management 
of meetings, training, and exercising, and development of a continuous process of 
improvement and revision. The plan takes leadership to build relationships that will be 
vital when the plan is activated; it requires the cooperation and visualization of the end 
goal that the emergency support functions work in concert, as well as an 
acknowledgement of a common mission. 
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2. Credentialing Personnel and Typing Resources 
Since September 11, 2001, and highlighted again by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, 
there has been a critical demand for a common authentication credential that first 
responders can use for all-hazards event response and recovery efforts (COFRAC, 2008, 
p. 5). Having personnel credentialed ahead of an incident will promote rapid response 
and recovery operations in the event of a terrorist or other all-hazards incident. 
Credentialing first responders across a state in compliance with the same minimum 
standards, as well as with federal standards, will facilitate movement across jurisdictional 
boundaries during a catastrophic event. 
The process of credentialing personnel produces a standardized, measureable 
output of homeland security and emergency management funding inputs. The output 
indicates an individual responder’s collective of knowledge, skill, certification, and 
physical ability to perform certain job functions at an incident—this collective capability 
is known as qualifications. Additionally, a credential (physical-presented card) will 
contain information about those qualifications and skills, so that incident command will 
immediately know the types and quantities of the resources available on-scene. The result 
is a safer, more efficient, and more effective deployment and utilization of resources at 
the incident site.  
Credentialing personnel and assets achieves a standardized, measureable output; it 
provides a measure of trained and qualified personnel that, collectively with the proper 
resources, are the components of capability. Outputs alone, however, do not indicate how 
the capability performs during an actual emergency event and, therefore, one can only 
draw speculation about preparedness and risk-informed capability level achieved through 
these investments. In the absence of a real-world event, validation through exercises 
under conditions that closely match a likely event is the only way to measure the 
effectiveness of these investments. 
3. Validating Capability 
As stated earlier, outputs permit an emergency management organization to assess 
progress, which is Congress’s underlying preparedness question. What quantitatively has 
the public received for the dollars spent on emergency management and homeland 
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security? However, outputs only give an indication that the funds were used 
appropriately. Capability validation can only be achieved through exercises and real-
world events. In the absence of real-world events, exercises provide the least costly 
method of validation. Exercise planning must include resources that would sequentially 
arrive and be required to work together. Training and exercising in a silo only reinforces 
an unrealistic expectation, and worse, leads to coordination challenges in the field. For 
example, the local fire department must engage and coordinate with a hazardous 
materials team, who in turn must coordinate efforts with the National Guard’s Civil 
Support Team. Validation is more encompassing than merely checking off skills and 
procedures; it is about understanding capability and working together as an incident 
escalates; and it is about holistically planning and exercising for the at-risk challenges the 
county is facing. 
As the nation moves into the future, addressing risk and strategically building the 
capability to address it are homeland security’s chief deliverables (output); they provide a 
vehicle for gauging whether we are doing things right with investments in money and 
time. Former DHS Secretary Chertoff asserts that the greatest risk we face is to fail to 
address adequately the [natural, technological, and terrorist] threats to life, safety, and 
security of the nation (Chertoff, 2009, p. 123). To that end, the outputs of risk planning 
and risk management, through protective measures, mitigation opportunities, and 
collaborative response networks, will be the benchmarks to address the risks the nation 
faces, and will lead to the impact of national resiliency. 
D. IMPACTS 
Impacts are the hopefully positive results for those whom the organization 
intended to benefit with its programs. Impacts are the qualitative gauge that tells us if we 
are doing the right thing. Are the inputs and processes effective? Are the outputs leading 
to the intended effect on the public, the economy, and the environment? The true impact 
of preparedness is the results after the disaster; however, those types of evaluations are to 
be avoided wherever possible. Conventional wisdom tells us that prevention, protection, 
and mitigation activities are many times more important than the response and recovery 
emphasis. Stopping a fire from starting in the first place is better than having to respond 
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to one and dealing with the negative result of it happening. The irony of positive impacts 
of preparedness is that the public becomes apathetic toward funding it as the incidence is 
reduced. The public may begin to question the utility of it or eliminate it.  
In emergency management, impacts are found in two focus areas: in preparedness 
of people and capacity, and in the ability to help a community to arrive at the new normal 
after a disaster. Impacts can be measured in terms of people who accomplish positive 
effects on people’s lives; in conditions that can be changed to improve safety, security, 
stability, and pride; in protection and mitigation activities to prevent future losses through 
public education and information to react proactively; and by creating advocates through 
leadership that enhance the results—force multipliers. 
These critical impacts in the emergency management enterprise are based on the 
relationships created before an event occurs—when an emergency strikes, knowing your 
partners ahead of time will have a greater impact on the end result than meeting them for 
the first time at the emergency. Improved thought is arrived at through ongoing learning, 
including enhancements to knowledge, understanding, perceptions, attitudes, and 
behaviors. In short, it is creating a culture of preparedness. Developing regional 
collaborative networks provides collectively what each jurisdiction cannot provide 
separately. Regionally collaborative approaches in government have long been heralded 
as a preferred method of working more effectively and efficiently. Part of the common 
wisdom of emergency management is that communication and collaboration are 
facilitated by personal familiarity, not just institutional contact (Waugh and Streib 2006, 
pp. 136–37). How can one measure the impact of these concepts? Impacts are measured 
qualitatively (that is, by opinion and by intrinsic value to the stakeholder). 
Organizational impact is achieved when stakeholders believe they are getting 
value from the organization. Value is the perception of intrinsic worth, and it provides a 
benefit to the individual making the judgment. Value creation in emergency management 
is increasingly becoming a concept that has been embraced in service delivery. To 
maximize value creation and deliver greater impact for stakeholders, emergency 
management professionals must be visible leaders at all times, be transparent to establish 
public confidence and trust, and communicate directly to the public needs—these will be 
keys to success during a major emergency. Intrinsic value can also be measured outside 
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of the emergency event, in terms of mitigation and recovery, which builds communities 
that are resilient in the face of a disaster. 
1. Resilience Impact 
Resilience has a rich background in various disciplines, including psychology, 
ecology, environmental science, engineering, management, and organizational behavior 
research. As a concept, it continues to evolve and to be applied to new areas. More 
recently, it has been put to use in the domains of emergency preparedness and hazards, 
where a resilience perspective can improve efforts to prepare and respond to risks. In this 
area, the resilience cycle—which includes mitigation, preparation, response, and 
recovery—serves as a guide and can help officials distinguish between physical and 
social systems that are highly resilient and those whose resilience is low. In a high-
resilience system, risk is distributed, challenges are commonly understood, and response 
efforts are coordinated. Such systems are furthermore embedded in risk communication 
and strategic risk management principles. Conversely, in a low-resilience system, risk has 
a disproportionate impact on certain sectors, and a society struggles to cope with and 
rebound from a crisis. The main challenge, thus, lies in crafting high-resilience societies 
(Zurich, 2009, pp. 1–2). 
2. Community Resilience 
The definition of resilience differs somewhat in the literature, but generally 
includes measures that make it possible for key infrastructures, economic activities, and 
other parts of society to rapidly “bounce back” after a disruption. It also includes 
mitigation measures to limit potential damage to facilities, supply chains, and other 
elements of the infrastructure so they can continue to function (Jackson, 2008, p. 3). 
Cascio (2009) views resilience simplistically as “[t]he capacity of an entity […] to 
withstand sudden, unexpected shocks, and (ideally) be capable of recovering quickly 
afterwards.” The Resilient Communities Research Consortium’s (RCRC) Community 
Engagement Resilience Framework (CERF) focused on the development of key 
indicators of community resilience along with measures of the indicators that produce 
information from which an assessment of resilience status can be made (Gragg et al., 
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2012). The RCRC and others (Buckle et al., 2000, pp. 11–13, Cutter, 2008, pp. 4–10, The 
White House, 2008, p. 13, Chandra, 2012) identify several key factors that have been 
recognized as interpreting or affecting community elasticity: 
• Emergency/Community Planning 
• Capacity and Reliability Status 
• Community Support Services 
• Social, Cultural and Natural Resources Status 
• Infrastructure Systems Redundancy 
• Preparedness and Mitigation Levels 
• Information and Communication Resources 
• Leadership Commitment 
Resiliency can be achieved by either creating redundancy or increasing flexibility. 
Adding mitigation measures will buy a lower, but more certain benefit by preventing only 
some of the damage from attacks [or other disasters], but doing so predictably across the 
many different ways in which threats might become manifest (Jackson, 2008, p. vii). The 
essence of resilience is to contain, adapt, and recover from a major disturbance or an 
unexpected negative event. In a comprehensive emergency management system, it is 
about strategically planning and holistically developing the capability and capacity 
needed to respond to disasters and to deploy those resources during an emergency event. 
The true measure of community resilience during a disaster is time (Catlett, 2010). It is 
the time from the disastrous event to the point where a newly formed sense of 
equilibrium and certainty returns—often called the new normal. 
E. LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT 
The organizational title “emergency management” lends itself to a finite process 
to meet the challenges or objectives posed by a disaster—one cannot solely manage 
through major events. Emergency management is also about leadership. It is not only the 
catastrophic planning, organizing, and categorizing resources or implementing and 
evaluating exercises; emergency management is also about learning from and 
collaborating with others, gaining cooperation and focusing efforts, mobilizing resources, 
and motivating performance. Both management and leadership are necessary during a 
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disaster and contribute in different ways to produce the outcomes needed to support the 
people affected and minimize the consequences of an incident. Management and 
leadership are as integral to outcomes as the two wings are to an airplane—without both, 
the plane does not fly. 
Collectively, emergency management and leadership work to build strategic 
relationships, enhance cooperation, and develop regional partnerships. Together, they 
enhance and improve the methods and processes by which the needed resources are 
placed in the field of operations. More important than the individual capabilities 
developed is the collective capacity and reliability of the resources in the response 
networks that are realized. The resiliency goal established in PPD-8 is about developing 
capacity that is adaptable, flexible, prepared, ready, and motivated to produce the 
quantitative outputs and the qualitative impacts that support the outcomes needed. As 
stated in the QHSR, it is the effective response and rapid recovery that supports the 
Ensuring Resilience Mission (2010, p. x). The resiliency mission is equally anchored in 
an enterprise that values both management and leadership.  
Leadership provides the intangible assets that cannot always be measured. 
Emergent leadership finds relationships that provide key decisions, innovative, creative, 
and novel thinking during chaotic incidents. Leadership also acts as the catalyst for high 
quality service to the stakeholders, motivates employees to seek continuous improvement 
of processes and capabilities, and utilizes information technology to enhance the service 
delivery (Kaplan and Norton, 1996, p. 3). Leadership develops the knowledge capital and 
communicates the vision to its stakeholders—both internally and externally to the 
organization. However, if leadership provides the way forward, management provides the 
methods to make it happen. 
On the management side, activities include catastrophic planning, organizing, and 
categorizing resources, as well as implementing and evaluating exercises. The results of 
these management activities are capabilities-based planning for high consequence events. 
Regional response partnerships develop the resource organizing needs; however, the 
resources require interoperability. To manage these needs, FEMA has developed resource 
typing and position task books for credentialing personnel. The goal of the guidance is to 
facilitate multijurisdictional coordinated responses. Through this guideline, DHS/FEMA 
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encourages interoperability among federal, state, local, territorial, tribal, and private 
sector officials to facilitate emergency responder deployment for response, recovery, and 
restoration (FEMA, 2011, p. 1). These planning processes and systems have served the 
emergency management mission space well, although today a new leadership-
management model is necessary for today’s challenging emergency management world. 
1. New Leader-Manager  
The public demands emergency management-leadership that is credible, capable, 
timely and visible. Credible leaders are those individuals that people believe in and trust 
during a disaster. They are honest, competent, forward-thinking and motivational 
(Kouzes and Pozner, 2000)—the difference this makes during disasters is very evident. 
Engaged leadership that communicates with the public with honesty and compassion will 
affect community outcomes and will positively affect the crisis phase of the incident. It is 
very important to have a trustworthy leader who is visible, compassionate, prepared to 
offer a plan that has solutions, and who can be counted on to communicate to the affected 
community. During the 9/11 terrorist attack in New York City, Mayor Rudy Giuliani was 
known as a good manager, he prepared himself to provide the leadership the city and the 
country needed at that moment. In Giuliani’s words: 
Leaders may possess brilliance, extraordinary vision, fate, even luck. 
Those help; but no one, no matter how gifted, can perform without careful 
preparation, thoughtful experiment and determined follow-through. 
(Giuliani, 2002, p. 52) 
Equally important is leadership in the steady state, and it is not exclusively in one 
individual. Achieving efficient and effective national preparedness requires an array of 
government and non-government organizations to coordinate their planning, 
collaboration, and response to anticipated terrorist acts (Carter, 2003, pp. 17–36). 
Emergency management leaders are in a unique position to influence and accomplish 
such collaboration of effort across organizations. Individuals with the skills to collaborate 
across jurisdictions and disciplines, whether it is in multi-agency settings, public, or 
private, are termed “meta-leaders” (Marcus, Dorn and Henderson, 2005, p. 44). In this 
time of diminished funding, emergency leadership and management require individuals 
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who can provide direction, facilitate change, and achieve results through efficient, 
creative, and responsible use of resources (Armstrong and Stephans, 2005, p. 11). 
Emergent leadership also is not always defined by one person—a single leader cannot be 
everywhere at all times. In emergency management and homeland security, emergent 
leadership comes from an ongoing process of organizational preparedness and succession 
planning. What the emergency management team delivers together is greater than the 
sum of the individuals on the team—leadership is distributive mix of the meta-leaders. 
The new leadership-manager promotes and develops the holistic approach for solving 
broad-based complex problems by breaking down organizational barriers to success, and 
effectively develops a coordinated response to a crisis or an emergency. 
2. Holistic Approach 
To develop a successful strategy, it must be based on the best information 
available, and it must be comprehensive in the use of the responding personnel. For that 
reason, emergency management or response organizations must work collaboratively and 
cooperatively in pursuit of common goals. Traditional governmental and non-government 
organizations are increasingly aware of the need for an all-hands approach. Without a 
holistic effort in disaster management, even a well-conceived operational strategy will be 
destined to coordination challenges during deployment. The stakeholders must be linked 
both horizontally in complementary action to achieve incident priorities, and also 
vertically as an event expands or cascades to levels beyond the original scope and 
complexity. A holistic approach develops coordinated redundancy for contingency 
reasons without creating competing duplicity at the expense of a finite number of 
resources, especially in the early stages of the incident. 
The social landscape of the nation is constantly evolving, and the needs and 
expectations placed on emergency management have changed as a result. The traditional 
view of the recovery mission is the “brick and mortar” efforts—that is, to replace, 
rebuild, or improve through mitigation—is now joined by emotional and psychological 
recovery efforts of a community. Today’s 24-hour news cycle significantly increases the 
connection to disasters. In large scale disasters, instead of providing generic counseling to 
the victims, quick recovery and return to normal routine has shown to be the most 
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effective in reducing stress in the community (Silove and Steel, 2006, pp. 121–125). In 
partnership with public health and non-governmental agencies, emergency management 
can assist with mental health resilience prior to a disaster. By building and sustaining 
disaster preparedness; by promoting social support, mental health alternatives, and 
information-sharing during a disaster; and by enhancing it with rapid response and 
recovery systems, the holistic approach is able to deliver the best outcomes. 
The military has come to know the value of a holistic approach in the national 
defense strategy. Since 1947, the service branches—Army, Navy, Air Force, and 
Marines—were united under a single Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) chairman. The Joint 
Forces Command (USJFCOM) supports unifying policies, strategies, and actions in a 
comprehensive approach that synchronizes, coordinates, and, when appropriate, 
integrates military operations with the activities of other governmental and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) to achieve unity of effort (JCS, 2011, p. I–8). 
USJFCOM embraces the goal of having military leaders connect with civilian 
counterparts to leverage the diverse powers of government, resulting in a shared 
interagency situational awareness among partners and creating a common operational 
picture (USJFCOM, 2012). Most recently, President Obama recognized the value of 
having the National Guard and the civil support effort as part of the JCS. With the 
signing of the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (Greenhill, 2012), Air Force 
Gen. Craig R. McKinley became a member on December 31, 2012. A state’s National 
Guard plays a pivotal role in connecting federal assets to local communities where the 
assistance will be needed during an incident of national significance. 
Within emergency management, the holistic approach is manifested in FEMA’s 
Whole Community. The “all of community–all of government” concept is an all-hands 
approach to disaster response and recovery. This approach is not new or innovative; it 
rises out of the original neighbor-helping-neighbor mindset when disaster strikes in the 
community; however, it provides a focus for emergency management stakeholders to 
develop relationships, plans, and systems. It was apparent during the Joplin tornado in 
2011, where the federal, state, local, and private sector joined with volunteer and non-
profit agencies to a contributed response effort when the city and Jasper County were 
quickly overwhelmed (FEMA, 2011a, p. 10). By focusing on regional collaboration and 
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partnering; developing operational capacity and ensuring its readiness; and standardizing 
response systems, communications, and information flow – irrespective of the level of 
government, whether from the public or the private sector - will create the foundation for 
these core capabilities. (NOT SURE WHAT THIS MEANS) The true impact will be 
realized when all stakeholders, the supporting systems, and ready capabilities are 
working together toward common goals—”a holistic approach” to preparedness and 
response. 
Summary 
This section took a wide view of the many working parts of emergency 
management and homeland security as a whole, as well as what has worked successfully 
toward achieving outcomes. The goal of this section was to organize these successes, 
both deductively and anecdotally, into mutually-inclusive compartments. The outcomes 
logic model was used as a starting point for the organization of the key points in the 
successes revealed in the research. The outcomes logic model has practical application in 
preparedness, since it is used in many government approaches and private industries to 
measure performance and assure constant improvement. These successful methods and 
systems are arranged by inputs, whether they are people, funding, or raw materials; 
processes that incorporate and mold the inputs into tangible or reportable outputs that are 
measured and analyzed; and an intended impact internally or externally to the 
organization. The measurable outputs are used to indicate performance and suggest 
anomalies that require attention; the impact is measured by customer satisfaction and the 
sense of value the organization creates. 
This section also explored the organizational effect of the leadership-management 
relationship on the overall outcomes delivered; how leadership and management are 
mutually-inclusive as to the effect on overall performance, but mutually-exclusive of 
what purpose and requirements each delivers on. Leadership goes first to point the 
direction, and management makes it happen. The holistic approach in emergency 
management is a necessary example of the need for sound leadership and management. 
Leaders understand that no single entity or organization responds to a disaster alone; 
leaders break down barriers and find solutions that achieve outcomes. Managers make 
practical sense of these solutions and build systems, coordinating resources, and 
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improving processes to ensure the goals established are reached. Collectively, the leader-
manager develops the strategy or methodological approach to ensure success and to 
deliver value. The next section will explore the importance of strategy and how it fits into 
the model being constructed. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGY 
Strategy development has been integral to military, national, and, in the past 11 
plus years, homeland security. Its historical use is well-documented based on the need to 
organize the resources of an entire group or nation. The first Homeland Security Strategy, 
released in 2002, provided focal points for the nation to follow, and it provided guidance 
for the newly emerging challenges posed by the age of terrorism. Inclusive of today’s 
strategy to protect and prevent harm to the nation, is building the capability to respond to 
a disaster and for our communities to survive and thrive in the life afterward. The term in 
our discourse is resiliency of our communities and the nation. While the initial Homeland 
Security strategy barely touched the concept of community resilience, the Quadrennial 
Homeland Security Report (2011) and the National Security Strategy (2010) emphasize it 
Carl Folke, a social-ecological scientist, asserts that in nature resilience is beyond 
merely the capacity to absorb shocks and still maintain function; it includes the capacity 
of a system to continually change and adapt, yet remain within critical thresholds; it is the 
long-term capacity of a system to adapt to change and continue to develop (2006, p. 259). 
For our nation to survive, our homeland security strategy must also have the capacity to 
absorb an assault and survive, while having the adaptability to change and evolve over 
the long term. The strategy must evolve as the global strategy on terrorism and the 
cascading complexities from natural and man-made disasters increases. The strategy is 
simple: adapt or perish. Charles Darwin’s Theory of Evolution puts resilience into 
perspective: survival of the fittest—not necessarily the strongest or the smartest—the 
fittest for the environment. It takes an all-hands, properly aligned, and forward thinking 
strategy to maintain the fitness for today’s homeland security environment. 
A. IMPORTANCE OF STRATEGY 
Strategy is generally thought of as a pattern of consistent behavior over time. It is 
a mix of intended and realized behavior. It combines visions of the future with emergent 
adaptations (Bellavita, 2006, p. 15). In its most basic business terms, is a systematic 
pattern of actions and approaches designed to serve the organization’s stakeholders and 
achieve its objectives; strategy is in part deliberate and part adaptive (Thompson and 
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Strickland, 1999, p. 25)—strategy is a method of developing a business plan. In private 
industry, strategic management is not merely managing business processes or measuring 
outputs; strategy is about leadership instilling organizational purpose and delivery of 
valued results, as well. It is not just how an organization is going to achieve a position; it 
is about why it is important to its stakeholders. A state’s homeland security and 
emergency management strategies must be crafted to achieve outcomes that are both 
proactive (intended) and reactive (adaptive). At the same time, they must build needed 
capability and create value for the state.  
A distinction must be drawn between operational strategies and strategic 
management. Operational strategies, by definition, are the systematic directions (current 
methods) and control of operational processes (Certo, 2000, p. 556). This type of 
management is contained within ongoing monitoring of initiatives, projects, and 
coordination of workgroups, as well as tactical operations for emergency events—it is an 
ongoing, perpetual process. Many homeland security strategies are organized around 
operational strategies rather than strategic management. Conversely, strategic 
management is a process that ensures the future viability and success of an organization. 
It is characterized by a forward-looking conceptualization of the future given the 
intelligence and the environment that exists today. It combines sound management 
practices enhanced by leadership principles. 
Within the mission space, a vision provides the guiding direction for purposeful 
action, and the strategy provides the method for its development. The intended outcomes 
are first developed from strategic mapping into themes or the “pillars of success.” These 
themes are converted into strategic broad-based goals and finally into measurable 
objectives. These specific objectives become the benchmarks for tracking progress and 
setting future performance objectives. In the post-9/11 era, these performance objectives 
must be flexible and account for the changing environment, so continuous improvement 
and adaptability must be considered because they drive change in strategy. 
A sound state strategy is composed of five essential, interrelated components 
grounded in the mission space. A homeland security strategy must align and balance the 
state’s inputs, processes, outputs, and impacts to a vision of a safe, secure, and resilient 
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homeland where the national interests, aspirations, and way of life can thrive (QHSR, 
2010, p. 3). The strategy is a pathway for what to do and how to do it by aligning people 
and resources with goals and objectives. A strategy provides benefits to the organization 
because it focuses and verifies the mission and ensures that the organization is providing 
value to its stakeholders. How has our homeland security strategy evolved? 
With the paradigm shift out of 9/11, the 2002 Homeland Security Strategy was 
based on three goals: prevent terrorist attacks, reduce vulnerability, and minimize damage 
and recover from successful attacks (OHS, 2002, p. vii). In 2004, the 9/11 Commission 
followed up with a number of recommendations to accomplish those goals. In 2007, the 
Strategy evolved somewhat with four goals: prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks; protect 
our people, critical infrastructure and key resources; respond and recover from incidents 
that do occur; and strengthen the foundation to ensure long-term success (HSC, 2007, p. 
1). In 2005, Hurricane Katrina and the following Post Katrina Emergency Management 
Reform Act in 2006 brought about another paradigm shift and realization that there is 
more to securing America than the threat of terrorism. 
Earlier President Bush, and increasingly now President Obama, has been evolving 
the term “resilience” in their description of national and community preparedness—it has 
become an integral term in the homeland security discourse. In 2010, the Quadrennial 
Homeland Security Review established a strategic framework and developed five mission 
areas: preventing terrorism, securing our borders, enforcing immigration laws, 
safeguarding cyberspace, and ensuring resilience to disasters (QHSR, 2010, p. x). PPD-8 
defines resilience as the ability to adapt to changing conditions and withstand and rapidly 
recover from disruption due to emergencies. PPD-8 does not seek to eliminate risk, but 
rather to effectively manage it and minimize the consequences. To achieve the resilient 
nation goal, one could conclude that our strategy and our resources must be focused on 
two themes: that of preparedness and prevention before disasters and that of response and 
recovery afterward. 
B. STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT 
From a business perspective, strategic alignment is a process of bringing the 
actions of an organization’s business divisions and staff members in line with the 
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organization’s planned objectives. In emergency management, achieving this means 
having to bring many organizations, whether it is government, private sector, or volunteer 
organizations, together to achieve the strategic goals in a holistic manner. Having a 
comprehensive strategy for homeland security and emergency management will assure 
that these disparate organizations are working toward achieving their part in concert in 
pursuit of the goal identified in PPD-8 of ensuring a secure and resilient nation. Strategic 
alignment is more than the strategy itself; it is the understanding of how the development 
of personnel and the use of resource inputs relate to the processes and network systems 
that make things happen. It promotes alignment of human capital with the organization’s 
mission, goals, objectives, and initiatives by means of effective analysis planning, 
budgeting, measurement, and continuous process improvement.  
1. Strategic Planning 
For a sustainable, ongoing strategic planning and evaluation process to become 
institutionalized, broad-based stakeholder participation is necessary; it enables a high 
degree of proactive coordination of strategic divisions, funding, and knowledge capital; 
and it diminishes any potential disruptive effects of periodic external demands for 
planning documents, goals, objectives, measures, and evidence (Greenfield, Williams and 
Eiseman, 2006, p. 29). However, strategic planning in the public sector must answer 
these additional questions:  
• What is the desired social outcome, or “public good” we will achieve? (Goals)  
•  How do we expect to contribute to, or influence, the outcome? (Strategies)  
•  What resources and support will be needed to implement the strategy? 
(Initiatives) 
a. Strategic Perspectives, Themes and Impact  
The first step in the strategic planning process is identifying the 
organizational perspectives, themes, and results intended. This step validates the mission 
and the values of the organization. It considers every critical influence on the 
organization, the environment in which it exists, and the value it delivers. This step also 
includes the traditional evaluation of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats 
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(SWOT). The governmental and not-for-profit arena differs from the business world in 
that decisions are made for the public good as opposed to the corporate bottom line; and 
stakeholders and communities replace the shareholders and investors. In governmental 
and not-for-profit organizations, public and stakeholder needs are considered with other 
external considerations (i.e., the economy, mandates and the political environment). 
Through the evaluation of the influences on the organization, strategic 
thought, innovation, and discovery emerge. What emerge are the confirmation of the 
organizational mission, new or confirmed perspectives on service, the need to deliver 
stakeholder value, and a long-range view of the future. In this step, themes and results 
that emerge from the process are the initial phase of development of a high level strategy. 
These become the foundation of a roadmap for success. Figure 5 provides one conceptual 
representation for the inherent considerations and systematic processing for strategy 








b. Strategic Mapping 
Another way of developing strategic themes and results is to assemble a 
strategic map. A strategy map provides a visual framework for an organization’s 
strategy—it shows how and where the strategy will create stakeholder value. The strategy 
map also develops the links between intangible and tangible assets with identified 
objectives having positive cause-and-effect relationships. It describes how an 
organization creates value using both its tangible and intangible assets, and it provides a 
framework by which important management decisions can be made (Kaplan and Norton, 
2004, p.1–2). Out of strategic mapping, themes emerge to become areas of concentration 
in the overall strategy, and these areas of concentration ensure the long-term value 
creation and success of the organization. 
Many statewide homeland security strategies miss this step in the 
development of their state’s strategy. These strategies have goals aimed at present-day 
orientation rather than future orientation. The early national strategy focused on present 
challenges, specifically prevention of terrorist attacks, reducing vulnerability to terrorism, 
and response and recovery from attacks (The White House, 2002, p. 3). In other words, it 
was all terrorism, all the time. The research has found that many state strategies are 
founded on capabilities-based planning, response, and recovery, while there should be an 
equal share of the strategy devoted to mitigation, preparedness, and resilience-building. 
In Figure 6, a possible strategic map for emergency management shows a 
framework to focus initiatives, activities, and funding. In the map, one can view the links 
between tangible and intangible inputs and processes, and the interdependence in support 
of a value-added system. The processes are again linked to intermediate output goals, and 
finally to strategic goals derived from the impacts of those outputs. A RAND Corporation 
study on strategic planning and evaluations for National Center for Injury Prevention and 
Control found two similar overarching themes that support this assertion. First, that 
coordination, communication, and capacity-building play a central part in processes and 
outputs; and second, that changes in knowledge, attitudes, and behavior inputs relate to 
intermediate customers, the results of their efforts, and final customers (Greenfield, 





Figure 6.  Strategic Mapping (Kaplan and Norton, 2004) 
The strategic mapping exercise visually identifies areas that an emergency 
management organization should focus on to develop outcomes that support a secure and 
resilient nation. In inputs, the focus is on people—creating a learning organization and 
developing avenues for inclusion of stakeholder ideas and thought. The broader and more 
diverse the input, create better chances of creating the notion of shared responsibility for 
a positive outcome during a disaster. In processes, the focus is on development of tools to 
enhance capability and direct the initiatives of the emergency management enterprise. 
Outputs are the measureable factors that result from inputs and processes—the plans, the 
communication systems, and capability—to support the mission of the emergency 
management enterprise. Often times, metrics can be used to monitor progress and 
successes. The impacts are realized when an emergency or disaster occurs, when the 
preparation of people to positively react to emergency, or for resources to effectively 
mitigate a crisis in a time-sensitive response. By identifying the focus areas, performance 
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measurement is not always possible; nevertheless, strategically performance 
measurement at some level is necessary to access progress.  
2. Strategic Performance 
Emergency management exists for the coordination of stakeholders in the 
enterprise for the benefit or outcome for the public during a major incident. The typical 
thought is the coordination of response assets during a major incident; however, the 
opportunities and time spent managing an incident is minimal. The greater share of the 
mission lies in the planning, preparation, and mitigation for future emergencies. Even 
though a performance check mark can be placed for having a plan or the purchase of a 
home in a floodplain, it is difficult to measure performance or to see the impact of these 
efforts other than through those future emergencies or cost avoidance comparisons to 
similar previous emergencies. 
As mentioned earlier, certain positive outcomes are predicatively based on 
practices and methodology, which cannot be measured. Therefore, methods to assess the 
enterprise must be developed. Effective emergency management organizations regularly 
take time to ask and answer a few critical questions:  
• Are we achieving our mission expectations? 
• Have we connected with our stakeholders? 
• What is our present position on preparedness? 
• Where should we be in the future? 
• How do we close the gap based on risk? 
• How will we know if we are succeeding? 
Many organizations utilize initiatives to break down goals and objectives into service 
requirements to fill gaps and motivate people to buy into the vision. Initiatives are the call 
to action, and it takes leadership to sell the “fit” of the initiative and put it into the context 
of the future position of the organization. 
a. Strategic Leadership   
The aim of strategy is to link ends, ways, and means; the aim of strategic 
leadership is to determine the ends, choose the best ways, and apply the most effective 
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means—it is a people-centric plan of action. Strategic leadership is the thinking and 
decision making required to develop and mobilize the plan (Guillot, 2003). Strategic 
leadership is leadership with purpose; it employs strategic thinking. Strategic thinking 
focuses on finding and developing unique opportunities to create value by enabling a 
provocative and creative dialogue among people who can affect an organization’s 
direction—it is the input to strategic planning. Strategic thinking is a way of 
understanding the fundamental drivers of an enterprise by challenging conventional 
wisdom (CFAR, 2004). In its most basic sense, strategic thinking is about analyzing 
opportunities and problems from a broad perspective and understanding the potential 
impact they have. Strategic thinkers visualize what might or could be and take a holistic 
approach to day-to-day issues and challenges (Harvard Business, 2007). 
Strategic leadership is the core of any strategy; it includes the most 
essential element that brings a plan of action to fruition—it focuses on the people 
carrying out the plan. It creates an environment that draws out an all-hands approach to 
solving problems. Emergency management professionals are in a unique position to bring 
individuals of diverse backgrounds from all levels of government—from public to private 
sector, to volunteer and faith-based organizations—under one umbrella to solve today’s 
homeland security challenges. These emergency management professionals are meta-
leaders. Meta-leaders prevail because they take the time to listen and learn from the 
disparate groups in emergency management and understand the challenges facing the 
nation; they envision the larger picture of how individual agencies must interact and 
cooperate in service to rapidly react and respond to lessen the effects of the disaster. A 
meta-leader has to gauge the risk in moving forward with a good plan before the 
groundwork is laid, and understand the consequences when an incomplete plan is forced 
(Marcus, Dorn and Henderson, 2005, p. 48). We cannot fully define leadership without 
the context in which it is demonstrated; however, the importance cannot be overstated. 
Moreover, leadership has no quantitative value that can be placed on it. A leader may be 
considered poor by his/her peers, but could show leadership in a particular event. 
Leadership, therefore, is not subject to a system of metrics, but it is a valued element of a 
successful emergency management program. 
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b. Strategic Initiatives 
Every task, initiative, process, purchase, and exercise must support and be 
in alignment with the mission, with an eye on the evolving vision of the future. Initiatives 
are projects and programs that contribute to or improve an organization’s strategic goals 
and its mission, but are targeted to a specific area where performance is lacking. 
Initiatives are the foundation of the strategic plan; it is an organization’s call to action. 
When initiatives are presented, they must answer a need; they must identify who/what 
will benefit short and long term from the initiative; and what does it look like in the entire 
performance equation or the organizational mission. In short, how will we know when we 
have arrived? 
Emergency management and homeland security organizations must be 
keenly aware of the lack of performance measurement. Performance can only be 
measured by an actual event or through full-scale exercises; they provide a glimpse into 
capability and capacity building in action. The Homeland Security Exercise and 
Evaluation Program (HSEEP) is a five-phase process that provides the tools needed to 
plan, design, conduct, evaluate, and improve capability within progressive operations-
based exercises. The National Governor’s Association asserts that by conducting 
preparedness exercises and readiness assessments, capability and response plans can be 
assessed for relevant homeland security and emergency management incidents (NGA, 
2010, p. 15). Effectiveness and efficiency are quantified by the Homeland Security 
Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) through preparedness exercises (HSEEP, 
2007, p. 20); however, HSEEP is still organized and based on capabilities-based planning 
and not the outcome delivered by the capability.  
c. Strategic Management 
Strategic management is an active process that achieves future-oriented 
goals to secure a preferred position for an organization. Once the organization’s better 
position is defined, strategic management establishes of a plan of action, organizes its 
operating divisions around the plan, and then implements the plan. For the plan to 
achieve success moving to the preferred future position, strategic management measures, 
monitors, and evaluates progress to ensure it is reaching its benchmarks. Measurement of 
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performance answers two overarching questions: Are we doing the right thing, and are 
we doing it right? Woodbury posits that “measuring effectiveness is not always done at 
the level of final outcomes. Often, the processes and systems that lead to preferred 
outcomes are measured when ultimate outcome measurement is impossible (Woodbury, 
2005, p. 2).” This would suggest that we can measure the tangible inputs (i.e., funding 
and training hours) and processes and outputs (i.e., showing productivity with response 
plans and mitigation projects) to see if we are doing things right. Conversely, there exists 
a higher degree of difficulty measuring intangible inputs and impacts in the pursuit of the 
“preferred outcomes.” There is extreme difficulty in answering the question: Do we have 
the proper level of capability, coordination, and leadership in place to make a positive 
impact on a community’s recovery after a disaster strikes? Performance measurement and 




Figure 7.  Performance Measurement for Outcomes 
The continuous improvement process is fundamental to strategic management to 
measure progress and, ultimately, to validate the strategy used to reach the preferred 
future. From a purely management perspective, “measurement ensures completion.” 
However, performance measurement is an organization-wide commitment to individual 
and organizational learning that supports systems improvement and shared responsibility, 
having an equal share of leadership—at all levels of the organization. By creating 
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systems and processes that support these activities and integrate them into the fabric of 
daily operations, companies can manage their learning more effectively (Garvin, 1993, p. 
2). Process improvement, however, is not just fixing what is broken, but reevaluating the 
purpose for the process and discovering the root causes of failure. When an organization 
pursues Total Quality Management, it undergoes an introspective process that takes a 
system-wide look at the tools, methods, materials, and people that are integral to the 
process. The goal is to add value and efficiency to the organization while optimizing 
doing things right and doing the right thing. 
In emergency management, processes such as catastrophic planning, 
mitigation programs, and gap analyses are important continuous improvement areas that 
support statewide preparedness. Process is also important in response and recovery 
operations for training responders, standardizing requests for assistance, and for 
conducting damage assessments for supporting operational capacity. These operational 
processes must be standardized and consistent for resources to arrive when needed and 
work in concert. Process can be evaluated by visually laying the steps out, where 
redundancies and anomalies are exposed, and inputs and sequence improvements can be 
made. Process improvements add value to the organization. 
Thus, far, this paper has treated emergency management and homeland 
security as two separate, but interactive missions—what may start as a homeland security 
mission may end up being an emergency management mission (Holdeman, 2009). With 
new drivers of change—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—
our future may change the current definition of each to match the reality that has 
developed from today’s work. The 9/11 events started the homeland security journey, but 
strategic leadership will show the way into the future. It is because of today’s leader-
managers who contribute to FEMA’s Strategic Foresight Initiative that we will have 
insight to the future. Through today’s foresight and planning, strategic leader-managers 
create the future. 
C. RESILIENT STRATEGY DEFINED 
A strategy defines a comprehensive method of achieving a beneficial or preferred 
preparedness position, and strategy contains inherent flexibility that a goal-oriented plan 
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does not (BusinessDictionary, 2010). Strategy differs from a purely goal-oriented 
planning process in that planning is a method to achieve a pre-defined specific scenario 
or set of circumstances; however, strategic planning identifies a best course of action to 
achieve capabilities that meet the challenges of a wide-range of scenarios. Given the 
uncertainty of the homeland security threats and preparedness problem, the preferred 
outcome is to achieve broad-based, adaptable operational capabilities. A statewide 
strategy applies the tested and proven statewide capabilities-based homeland security 
through a risk-based strategic planning process. The process consists of four basic steps:  
1. Develop a vision based on forecasting. 
2. Assess risk and identify capability gaps. 
3. Develop and implement the State Strategic Plan. 
4. Synchronize funding with goals and objectives.  
In the past five years, the term “resilience” has entered into the homeland security 
discourse. In simplistic terms, resilience indicates an ability to “bounce back” after 
sustaining a setback. There have been many attempts at defining the term “resilience” 
within the homeland security enterprise, and the Department of Homeland Security 
stresses resilience as a strategic goal. The DHS defines it as “the ability to adapt to 
changing conditions and prepare for, withstand, and rapidly recover from disruption” 
(DHS Risk Lexicon, 2010, p. 26). A strategy of resilience anticipates and mitigates risks, 
but also addresses the consequences of a disastrous event and the amount of time taken to 
recover. A strategy is needed that takes the homeland security enterprise beyond the 
capabilities approach that holistically meets the challenges faced with asymmetrical 
actions of terrorism and an all-hazards response to natural and man-caused disasters. The 
recommended strategy necessitates the fusion of analysis and intelligence; of capability 
and response capacity; and of collaboration and coordination. 
Much has been written on the doctrine of a capabilities-based strategy, especially 
within the private sector and the military. At least since 2005, homeland security 
professionals have begun to embrace the concept as a mechanism to meet the challenges 
caused by terrorism, as well as natural and man-made disasters. The National 
Preparedness vision calls for coordinated capabilities to prevent, protect, respond to, and 
recover from all hazards to balancing risk with resources and need (NPG, 2007, p. 1). A 
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strategy based on capabilities enhances preparedness, response, and recovery, which is 
integral to the resilience of the nation (Romano and Anderson, 2010, p. 9). The 
Government Accounting Office (GAO) supports the claims that having strategic plans 
developed by regional organizations can be effective tools to focus resources and efforts 
to address problems (GAO, 2004, p. 4). 
However, the shortfall of CBP alone, based solely on capability development, 
does not accomplish the planning and operational realities of a catastrophic incident. 
Capability must be tied to mission, function, or objective (DHS Risk Lexicon, 2010, 
p.16) in a comprehensive approach; an approach that is holistic; and an approach that is 
in concert with all stakeholders—public sector, private sector, and citizens at large. The 
difficulty with CBP alone is that it promotes vertical integration within organizations and 
agencies, rather than the development of complementary, collaborative redundancies 
across the homeland security enterprise. Resilience is instead achieved by engaging 
emergency management practitioners in preparedness and response during trans-incident 
activities, such as of prevention, protection and mitigation, and during incidents with 
rapid response, coordination, and recovery activities. The 9/11 Commission pointed out 
that the September 11th “attacks revealed four kinds of failures: in imagination, policy, 
capabilities, and management.” (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 339). Capabilities are only 
part of the equation. While the commission report and this statement was written largely 
about the pre-9/11 intelligence and counterterrorism failures, the same argument could 
have been made about the state of national preparedness and response to all emergencies. 
Beyond the ability to resist, absorb, and recover from a disaster found in the 
definition of resilience (DHS Risk Lexicon, 2010, p.23), a resilient strategy also has the 
capacity of an organization to recognize threats and hazards and make adjustments that 
will improve future protection efforts and risk reduction measures. To integrate resilience 
to a homeland security enterprise, the strategy must build capability that is able to protect 
its infrastructure sufficiently, being adaptable and scalable to all types of emergencies, to 
restore a community, state, or region, to as near normal as soon as possible. A resilient 
strategy builds this capability over a period of time, incrementally making additions, 
adjustments, and improvements in a repeating process. The final element that determines 
the resiliency strategy is basing on a risk-informed methodology. It must be noted that the 
88 
 
risk of a terrorist attacks, natural, or technological disasters cannot be totally eliminated; 
a nation’s quest to eliminate it is flawed in that it will ultimately result in harming what it 
is attempting to protect (Chertoff, 2009, p. 155) —acts of nature, disease, and geo-
political disasters will happen. Even if possible, the cost of a risk elimination policy 
would not be able to be sustained for any length of time, as it would eventually bankrupt 
the nation. 
Emergencies and disasters are inherently plagued with many variables and 
unknowns, so the strategy must have the necessary flexibility and adaptability to address 
these variables and the complexity they create. Therefore, today’s strategy must be 
smarter and it must identify the “best option” to adapt to changing conditions and prepare 
for, withstand, and rapidly recover from these destructive events. Several common 
attributes of the most resilient systems seem to be emerging when the following attributes 
are addressed: 
• Broad-based participation, collaboration, and deliberation; 
• Multi-layered and polycentric organizational structures; 
• Networked organizational structures with mutual accountability built into how 
the network functions; 
• Content-rich and meaningful interaction regularly occurring across the 
network; and 
• Facilitative and/or catalytic leadership (in sharp contrast with authoritative or 
control-oriented leadership) (Armitage, 2008, pp. 16–7 and Palin, 2010, p. 
10). 
These are fundamental components of an effective resilience strategy, and 
emergency management professionals are in the best position to make this strategy work. 
Only when most of these attributes are reflected in strategy, operations, and tactics will 
our homeland security effort generate a long-term comparative advantage. These 
attributes and activities contribute to the overall knowledge of the system and the 
environment, and the learning of the organization and the individual (Palin, 2010, p. 10). 
When an organization’s attitudes, actions, and culture are consistent with the attributes 
above, the resilience of whole system is enhanced. This underscores the need to establish 
the learning organization. 
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The NRF builds upon scalable, flexible, and adaptable coordinating structures to 
align key roles and responsibilities across the Nation. It describes specific authorities and 
best practices for managing incidents that range from the serious but purely local, to 
large-scale terrorist attacks or catastrophic natural disasters (NRF, 2008, p. i). In support 
of civilian response to a terrorist attack or major disaster, the NRF set the context for a 
coordinated response while the Stafford Act provided the statutory authority for federal 
disaster assistance from military resources in support of the civilian authorities. The NRF 
forms the basis and impetus for the development of a resilient strategy. 
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V. SYNTHESIS OF THE OUTCOMES-BALANCED 
FRAMEWORK 
Thus, far systems to provide a metric-based reporting summation by homeland 
security professionals have fallen short of providing a clear picture of our nation’s 
preparedness level. Rating systems that have been developed and that are in use today 
have focused on the outputs of the funding appropriations (i.e., equipment and training 
delivered to the responders, and self-assessed capability developed). Capability-based 
planning, originally developed by the military, enabled military agencies to identify 
program needs, allocate resources, and track activities and outcomes. It was adopted by 
the federal government as a method to begin the process of homeland security. 
Capabilities-based assessment system is widely identified in states’ homeland security 
strategies for addressing the new security and response threat, but Congress is now 
pushing for a preparedness status report. From the research and analysis, a model is 
synthesized that can be derived to support state strategies and performance tools in use.  
Capabilities are means to accomplish a mission, function, or objective (DHS 
Lexicon, 2010, p. 16). Capabilities give a tangible understanding of what resources can 
be brought to the fight, but they do not provide the complete picture of preparedness. 
There are intangibles that can only be measured in the real world and some that may 
never be measured (i.e., prevention and readiness activities), but are part of the “big 
picture” of homeland security preparedness. The combination of tangible and intangible 
assets needs to be assessed. Do the current rating systems give the answer? What lessons 
learned from the private sector experience in performance management can be used in the 
homeland security environment? 
A. BALANCED SCORECARD RELATIONSHIP 
In the private sector, the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) has been used successfully 
for measuring performance (Niven, 2003, p. 4); it defines a measurement tool for 
financial and customer results, operations, and organizational capacity. The BSC, 
developed in the early 1990s, provided a look at the results of operations (qualitative) in 
the form of customer satisfaction and the analytic benchmarks (quantitative) in the form 
91 
 
of financial returns (Kaplan and Norton, 1992, p. 73). The BSC offers the following 
benefits: 
• Designed to measure non-financial performance; 
• Aligns vision and mission with customer requirements and day-to-day 
work; 
• Manages and evaluates the business strategy; 
• Monitors operation efficiency improvements; 
• Builds organization capacity; and  
• Communicates progress to all employees (Rohm, 2002, p.1). 
The benefits of the BSC can be seen first in the emphasis on people and systems. 
Employee and knowledge capital, supplier inputs, operational processes, and quality 
improvement are value-added, controllable areas in an organization. Second, production 
outputs are measurable; they are utilized for managing performance, identifying areas of 
improvement, and confirming public stewardship of its allocated funds. However, 
management alone does not meet the performance picture in homeland security and 
emergency management. Leadership is also a necessary component to provide direction, 
facilitate collaboration, and enable people in the organization to realize the strategic 
themes identified. These preferred results offer value to the stakeholders in emergency 
management, and they confirm the niche (mission) held by the agency. 
How can the BSC answer the preparedness question? The BSC is named for the balance 
it provides between objective, easily quantified outcome measures and subjective, 
somewhat judgmental performance drivers of the outcome measures (Kaplan and Norton, 
1996, p. 10). The BSC identifies four critical focus areas in an organization: the 
financials, employee learning and growth, internal processes, and customer need (Niven, 




 Figure 8.  Balanced Scorecard 
 
At the center of the balance is the strategy that provides the method, alignment, 
and connection from each focus area to the organizational vision (direction) and between 
each focus area (coordination). Figure 8 is designed for the private sector, where the 
focus is on factors that keep an organization’s bottom line performance high (i.e., good 
workforce, quality management, expanding customer base, and delivering a profit for its 
shareholders). 
In Figure 9, Paul Niven has developed an adaptation of the BSC designed for 
government and nonprofit organizations (2003, p. 32). It asserts that, while accountable 
for the efficient use of funds, government and nonprofit organizations serve a higher 
purpose—the mission. The mission is the reason a government or nonprofit organization 
exists. Therefore, the overriding goal and focal point is to achieve the organizational 





Figure 9.  Balanced Scorecard for Non-profit Organization
 
B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE FRAMEWORK 
 




Niven offers an adaptation of the BSC for government and nonprofit 
organizations, and Caudle asserts that the BSC can be applied to the homeland security 
enterprise (Caudle, 2008). She offers five relationships that must be accounted for in the 
homeland security BSC: public stewardship, clientele impact, day-to-day processes, 
human capital support, and enabling support. Caudle’s assertion concludes with an 
underlying question: What scorecard design and organizational factors can respond to the 
complexities of homeland security delivery partner relationships, and the responsibilities 
and resulting strategy agreement (Caudle, 2008)? The question posed by Sharon Caudle 
prompts further research about the efficacy and utility of the BSC in the homeland 
security enterprise. The BSC, as modified by Caudle, provides an interesting starting 
point for researching and developing a performance system for emergency management – 
See Figure 10. 
1. Relationship to the Logic Model 
As explained in the section on Private Sector Assessment Systems in Chapter III, 
the BSC was initially developed for the private sector; however, it has relationship to the 
operations of nonprofit and governmental organizations. In simplistic terms, human 
capital and enabling support are the same raw material inputs in the emergency 
management system (i.e., funding, regional cooperation, and an organization that values 
education). Every organization has day-to-day processes to organize, streamline, and 
arrange the inputs to produce the end results intended by the organization to support the 
organizational mission space. 
Public stewardship is the effective and efficient use of the inputs, and the trust 
that the organization will do the things the right way. Public stewardship goes beyond 
accountability and trust; it is about integrity ingrained in the culture of the organization. 
Public organizations must never abuse the trust given—if confidence is lost, then no 
grand strategy or plan will work, no matter how well crafted. The term “integrity” here is 
not being used in its narrow sense as a synonym for honesty, but in its broad sense 
referring to the qualities of self-governance, responsibility, moral soundness, adherence 
to principle, and constancy of purpose (Paine, 1997, p. vii). Nonprofit and government 
organizations are entrusted by the people to take care of and create a return from the 
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resources inputs given, combining those with internal processes and producing the 
measurable outputs that were intended. 
While the management of resources given and processes used will produce an 
effective and efficient system demonstrating the organization is doing things right; it is 
leadership that delivers the results of the organization and demonstrates that it is doing 
the right thing and delivering on its mission. Ultimately, this determines whether the 
organization will continue to exist. Homeland security and emergency management are 
focused on both outputs that are measurable and provide an indication of performance, 
yet produce results that make an impact on a community’s quality of life. In the 




Figure 11.   Balanced Scorecard Simplified 
 
Organizations in the public sector have to be equally concerned with delivering on 
outputs for accountability purposes while delivering value in the results achieved. 
Outputs provide the feedback needed by our legislators and form the short-term impacts 
in the logic model. Currently, there are 108 committees, subcommittees and caucuses that 
received briefings or hear testimony from DHS officials on Capitol Hill (NPR, 2010); by 
contrast, the DoD with 15 times the budget has one Senate Oversight Committee. That 
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oversight has prompted the preparedness question of how better prepared is the nation 
since 9/11. Alternatively, we have anecdotal evidence and direct observation that the 
homeland security and emergency management investments have produced impacts that 
have made a positive difference in the resilience of our communities. Therefore, outputs 
and impacts carry equal weight and belong at the top of the emerging framework in the 




Figure 12.  Balanced Scorecard Relationship to the Outcomes Logic Model 
As described earlier, strategy is generally thought of as a pattern of consistent 
behavior over time. It is a mix of intended and realized behaviors. It combines visions of 
the future with emergent adaptations (Bellavita, 2006, p. 15). In business terms, it is a 
systematic pattern of actions and approaches designed to serve the organization’s 
stakeholders and achieve its objectives; strategy is in part deliberate and part adaptive 
(Thompson and Strickland, 1999, p. 25)—strategy is a method of developing a business 
plan. However, an emergency management strategy is based on strategic issues that 
emerge, so having a behavior or pattern to identify, adapt, and manage these issues is 
necessary. 
2. Organizing Around Strategy 
The use of strategic issues management, which addresses the primary strategic 
concerns of an organization or organizational system, is important in emergency 
management because of the occurrence of unexpected and surprise events. Koteen (1997, 
p. 69) argues that the criteria for identifying strategic issues include assessing (1) the 
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current or potential impact on organizational performance, (2) the perceived urgency in 
significant consequences, and (3) the impact or interdependency with other issues. Figure 
13 shows the interdependency of each functional area in the framework. Strategy, 
according to Niven, is the “how-to” vehicle by which the vision is realized. The inputs, 
processes, outputs, and impacts are delivered through the strategy that balances these 
cause and effect relationships. Therefore, the strategy is both shaped and developed by 
the strategic issues that emerge, and they are managed by the strategy that has been 
developed to address them. 
 
 
Figure 13.  Non-profit Scorecard for Relationship to the Outcomes Logic Model 
 
Because the inputs, processes, outputs, and impacts perspectives are connected to 
the organizational vision and are interdependent in the strategy, it is difficult to identify a 
clear continuum, as one would find in an assembly line. Changes in an individual 
perspective have a ripple effect on the other perspectives; therefore, the key is to keep the 
perspectives in balance and alignment through the strategy, with an eye on the direction 
the organization is headed. To address the National Preparedness Goal, the emergency 
management impact is the ability of our communities to return to the new normal as 
quickly as possible. To address Congress’s request, the outputs emergency management 
delivers can be defined by broad-based goals and measurable objectives using a 
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performance and continuous improvement system outlined earlier. The vision is at the 
center of the framework and aligns all functional areas of the emergency management 
organization—the inputs, processes, measurable outputs, and quality of life impact. Every 
decision, purchase, policy, hire, process, and plan, to name a few, is accomplished with 
the vision in mind. The strategy is the pattern of consistent behavior over time, both 
intended and realized, to arrive at the preferred future. 
To have a balanced preparedness system, an assessment process must look both 
retrospectively, in that it assesses how well the system worked in an actual event, and 
prospectively, to identify those emerging issues that must be anticipated. While learning 
from real-world experience is important, decision makers need better ways to assess 
preparedness prospectively to make better choices as to how and where to strengthen it 
(Jackson, 2008, p. 2). Therefore, the preparedness framework must account for the 
benefits of past performance and lessons learned to gauge whether targets, metrics, and 
objectives have been met and whether the desired outcomes that were set for emergency 
management enterprise have been reached. Equally important are the future factors that 
affect and create community resilience. These factors lead to the value created by the 
emergency management organization and fulfill its mission (See Figure 14). 
 




C. OUTCOMES-BALANCED SCORECARD FRAMEWORK 
The Outcomes-Balanced Framework balances input and processes with outputs 
and impacts—both quantitatively and qualitatively. Thus, far, inputs such as funding have 
been accounted for quantitatively, but as a raw material; however, collaborative 
workgroups, public-private partnerships, regional efforts, volunteerism, and learning 
organizations do not produce measurable outputs. Instead, they qualitatively lead to 
information and partnerships that result in success. Anecdotally, homeland security 
professionals know that not every preparedness effort can be measured. For example, 
there is no metric for the collaboration between organizations, yet we know that 
relationships developed prior to an incident enhance the effectiveness of the response. As 
such, an argument can be made that there are qualitative measures of success that cannot 
be put in terms of numbers. So how do we reconcile the preparedness checkbook? 
The nation’s preparedness picture must entertain the notion that not all efforts can 
be quantified. Then again, smart practices, properly developed initiatives, equipment 
acquisition, and training under good management will produce outputs that support 
preparedness. Conversely, when leadership delivers cooperation, building relationships, 
developing a culture of preparedness, and delivering value to the people being served, it 
leads to impacts that make a difference when disaster strikes. Management of inputs and 
processes provides the performance measures Congress is requesting. Leadership can 
enhance the quality of life challenges in the wake of an emergency or disastrous event 
and the resilience outcomes the nation is seeking. The Outcomes-Balanced Framework 
joins the quantitative, assumptions-based performance measurement with the qualitative 
community preparedness and resilience goals in support of the emergency management 
mission and stakeholder impact. Strategy aligns the organizational mission with the 
outcomes delivered with an eye on the vision and impact on our community, volunteer, 
and professional stakeholders. Impact is realized through the outcomes of a concerted 
strategy and observed or measured in the time to new normal after a disaster. Therefore, 
it takes equal parts of management and leadership to deliver the homeland security 






Figure 15.  Outcomes-Balanced Framework 
As the 10-year anniversary of 9/11 has come and gone, there is a growing call for 
reconciliation of the preparedness progress so far. With economically challenging times 
and the uncertainty of future funding, there is a demand for a performance system. The 
Department of Homeland Security’s Preparedness Task Force stated that while we 
uniformly believe that our nation is significantly better prepared than it was on 
September 11, 2001, each of us has significant anecdotal data unique to our jurisdictions 
to support this premise. Yet we acknowledge that, while stakeholders across the nation 
working to develop preparedness-specific measurable outcomes for these efforts, a truly-
defined, measurable preparedness system continues to elude the nation. 
The Balanced Outcomes Framework is an iteration of the BSC as proposed by 
Kaplan and Norton; it brings perspective to the complexity of the homeland security 
enterprise. The framework attempts to balance inputs and processes with outputs and 
impacts. The balanced outcomes framework is based on the questions: Are we 
performing the mission, are we prepared, and are we providing stakeholder value? The 
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researcher has found that there are quantitative preparedness efforts, those whose 
performance we can measure to determine if the enterprise is doing things right. 
 Summary 
The new National Preparedness Goal established in the Presidential Policy 
Directive 8 identifies resilience of our communities as the vision. It states that, “our 
National Preparedness Goal is a secure and resilient nation that has created that has to be 
for the organized commitment of the whole community, in the shortest possible time and 
under all conditions, to successfully prevent, protect, mitigate, respond, or recover from 
the threats that pose the greatest risk to the nation (2011, p.1).” The National 
Preparedness Goal, the inherent core capabilities, the National Preparedness System, and 
the THIRA do not measure preparedness; they outline the “right things to do” to achieve 
preparedness. There is no scorecard that will deliver this. 
FEMA will continue to explore ways to assess the value of grant funds on state 
and local preparedness capabilities, including quantitative and qualitative measures 
(GAO, 2010, p. 25). In the absence of an all-inclusive quantitative system of 
measurement, a qualitative, predictive model for operational success is called for. Using 
an outcomes-focused framework to predict the performance of the emergency 
management system will bridge the gap in preparedness assessment and support 




VI. CASE STUDY 
In this section, the research will explore the utility of the synthesized Outcomes-
Balanced Framework by drawing a direct comparison to the latest Presidential Policy 
Directive 8 (2011) on national preparedness. The case study will first look at the 
historical provisions of national preparedness starting in the Bush Administration and 
then transition to the Obama Administration. The shortfalls of a top-down approach to 
national preparedness will be outlined, and the lack of connection between the provisions 
of HSPD-8 and PPD-8 will become apparent. Furthermore, this section will directly 
compare the current policy and the proposed framework, comparing and contrasting the 
key provisions found in each. Specifically, it will look at the goal of preparedness; 
capabilities identified; risk assessment and the resulting requirements determined; 
sustainment of the emergency management/homeland security effort; and the 
preparedness vision. 
A. CASE STUDY—PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVE 8 
1. History and Overview of PPD-8 
With a renewed focus on strengthening the security, preparedness, and resilience 
of the Nation, the Obama Administration has revised HSPD 8 to the Presidential Policy 
Directive 8 (PPD-8). The new directive established an NPG, which identifies core 
capabilities [emphasis added] that address specific types of incidents that pose the 
greatest risk to the nation (FEMA, 2011, p. 8). The NPG calls for a secure and resilient 
Nation that has created the capacity for the organized commitment of the whole 
community, in the shortest possible time under all conditions, to successfully prevent, 
protect, mitigate, respond, or recover from the these major disasters (FEMA, 2011, p. 1).  
In the aftermath of 9/11, the federal government—through DHS—provided 
compelling need for developing emergency response preparedness and protecting the 
nation from disasters that impacts our communities. The Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive (HSPD) 5 policy directs the Secretary of the DHS to provide assistance to state 
and local governments to develop all-hazards plans and capabilities (HSPD-5, 2003, p.2). 
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To support HSPD-5, DHS developed the Universal Task List (UTL) containing 1600 
unique preparedness and capability tasks that support the Target Capabilities List (TCL). 
The TCL contains 37 core competencies designed as a guide for preparedness for a broad 
range of terrorism attacks and all-hazards response events (TCL, 2007, p. iii). These two 
documents form the basis for assessing emergency response preparedness and developing 
mission outcomes at all levels of government (TCL, 2007, p. 1). 
Seven National Preparedness Goals emerged from HSPD-8 that are essential for 
emergency response and management of disasters. In January 2008 the DHS released the 
National Response Framework (NRF), the successor to the National Response Plan 
(NRP). The NRF establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic 
incident response, and incorporated many NRP elements and along with lessons learned 
from the original plan. The new NRF provides guidance for the integration of 
community, state, tribal, and federal response efforts (NPD, 2007). Starting with the 2007 
National Strategy for Homeland Security, resilience has become a focus for preparedness, 
and the NRF forms the basis and impetus for the development of resilience as an 
outcome; however, the definition was lacking. The 2007 National Preparedness 
Directorate (NPD) was established to oversee coordination and development of strategies 
necessary to provide a comprehensive cycle of planning and preparedness for all-hazards. 
As part of this mission, NPD developed the NPG outlining four critical elements of the 
core preparedness vision; specifically, the planning scenarios aimed at high-consequence 
events. 
Like the HSPD-8, the PPD-8 addresses national preparedness and sets a National 
Preparedness Goal that establishes a vision, capabilities, and priorities. It also compares 
to HSPD-8 in that it is based on capabilities that strengthen the nation’s security and 
resilience and the preparation for high consequence emergencies and disasters. PPD-8 
places emphasis on the shared responsibility for preparedness and the development of the 
all five mission areas— prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery—
beyond the National Response Framework. PPD-8 also develops a National Preparedness 
System, which outlines a system to identify and deliver specific preparedness needs and 
sustainment based on risks identified in the THIRA process. 
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2. PPD-8 Performance Shortfalls 
In March 2011, President Barack Obama issued the Presidential Policy Directive 
8 (PPD-8), refocusing our national preparedness. While similar in many ways to its 
predecessor, the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8), PPD-8 brought in 
a heavier emphasis on identifying and managing risk with a vision of creating a resilient 
nation. Like HSPD-8, the PPD-8 focused on capabilities—the slightly upgraded 31 “core 
capabilities” as compared with the earlier 37 target capabilities. The PPD-8 outlined a 
system for national preparedness, called the National Preparedness System (NPS), which 
attempts to provide guidance where it had lacked standardization before. The NPS 
considers local and statewide differences in risk and capability, rather than a one-size-
fits-all preparedness methodology. The NPS provides a unique system and case study to 
measure future national preparedness models. The PPD-8 identifies the necessary 
performance objectives; however, it has yet to develop the metrics for assessing 
performance. Capabilities-based planning, which started in the military, served DHS well 
in the early years following 9/11; however, a method is necessary to put the capabilities 
together in resolving the consequences of a disaster. The literature reviewed provides a 
foundation for the understanding the difficulty answering the nation’s preparedness 
questions about how well prepared the nation is. 
In an effort to gauge progress, six evaluation efforts have been identified by DHS 
as keys to the assessment of preparedness—the State Preparedness Reporting (SPR) 
system, the National Incident Management System Compliance Assistance Support Tool 
(NIMSCAST), the Grants Reporting Tool (GRT), the Logistics Capability Assessment 
Tool (LCAT), the Gap Analysis Program (GAP), and the Cost-to-Capability (C2C) pilot 
program (GAO, 2010, p. 9). Each of current evaluation efforts is based on self 
assessment, leading to inconsistent results. FEMA concentrated efforts on the 
Comprehensive Assessment System (CAS) as a mechanism for capabilities assessment. It 
is based on the five-step process of defining, collecting, analyzing, reporting, and 
improving preparedness data (GAO, 2010, p. 27). The CAS was designed to effectively 
assess prevention, response, and recovery capabilities, eliminate redundant data calls, 
reduce the burden on respondents, and ensures the collection of meaningful data to guide 
policy and resource allocation decisions (FEMA, 2010d). To date, the CAS has not been 
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implemented due to the release of PPD-8, and questions continue about how to collect the 
right information without placing undue burden on the states (OIG, 2008, p. 10). 
The latest assessment system resulting from PPD-8 is the THIRA; it provides a 
snapshot of preparedness based on a sampling of emergency events specific to states. 
While the THIRA represents the first initiative by FEMA to assess risk by individual 
state, it gave a narrow window of time to perform a proper risk assessment and gave little 
in the way of guidance. As with the previous attempts at creating an assessment system, 
the THIRA will create inconsistencies between states and regions and will lack the 
meaningful results Congress is seeking. Furthermore, many initiatives that support 
security and resilience go unaccounted for, as well as the development of human capital. 
B. COMPARISON OF THE FRAMEWORK MODEL TO PRESIDENTIAL 
POLICY DIRECTIVE 8 
This thesis attempts to draw such an analogy between the PPD-8 and an 
Outcomes-Balanced Framework (OBF). The goal is to demonstrate the utility of the 
proposed model and compare it to the current national system outlined in PPD-8. Both 
models are in agreement that the traditional preparedness method—capabilities-based 
planning—requires an evolution to strategy and vision-centric methodology; however, 
each has differing avenues to achieve that end state. While it may be somewhat 
premature to judge the effectiveness of the tenets of PPD-8, there is considerable value in 
drawing similarities and differences between the national model and the proposed model 
for achieving national preparedness. There are five specific areas of comparison that will 
be noted as they relate to preparedness—a preparedness goal, a capabilities development 
process, a risk/requirements assessment, a sustainment system, and a strategic vision for 
national preparedness. 
1. Preparedness Goal 
The research has minimal argument with the National Preparedness Goal, in that 
it identifies the issues that must be addressed: risk, capability, and strategy. The whole 
community approach is very similar to the OBF development of the holistic approach. It 
is very evident today that resources operate much more effectively when there is central 
106 
 
coordination than they do working independently. The culture of most Americans is to 
help your neighbor when calamity befalls them; it is the basis of many mutual aid 
agreements. When disaster strikes, an all hands approach is imperative and necessary— 
volunteers and the private sector become a force multiplier for emergency management. 
2. Capabilities 
PPD-8 identified 31 core capabilities and HSPD-8 defined 37 target capabilities 
and the universal task list that provided definition to achieve the 37 capabilities. Most of 
the capabilities in both policies are similar, but several core capabilities (i.e., cyber 
security, situational assessment, forensics, and attribution) have no cross-walk to the 
target capabilities. Rather than develop an entirely different list, the OBF’s preferred 
approach would have been to modify and connect the existing target capabilities and then 
revise the critical task list. What is missing in both lists is how these capabilities work in 
concert during known disasters and known players. A combination of tasks and 
competencies should be developed for known response groups (e.g., during a building 
collapse). The goals should be to develop capabilities that coordinate fire service, medical 
teams, and law enforcement first responders with complementary capabilities from the 
sustaining National Guard force packages. 
3. Risk/Requirements Assessment 
Since 9/11, the nation has been identifying and assessing risk. Many risk 
calculations have been developed to allocate homeland security funding. Certain areas, 
(e.g., the Urban Area Security Initiative) were provided with special funding to address 
the risk associated with densely populated and critical node locations. The THIRA 
suggested a starting point for risk assessment at the state and local levels rather than 
develop an entirely different list. It should have been addressed in the years when funding 
homeland security first began to ramp up. Capability development and input allocation is 
also based on risk or known response needs in the OBF. 
4. Sustainment System 
The management of an organization includes a system for continuous 
improvement. PPD-8 utilizes the National Preparedness System that consists of six-step 
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process: identify and assess risk, estimate the capability requirements, build and sustain 
capabilities, plan to deliver capabilities, validate capabilities, and review and update as 
the environment changes. The OBF utilizes risk assessment similar to the THIRA, but 
differs in the subsequent steps. From the risk assessment, strategic mapping and 
alignment are used to identify focus areas and establish performance requirements; 
capabilities would be developed based on historic, state-specific needs, best practices, 
and a gap analysis. A continuous improvement system would create an ongoing process 
of evaluating performance measures for inputs, processes, outputs, and impacts. The 
continuous performance assessment system would monitor and find balance between 
doing things right (quantitative measures) and doing the right thing (qualitative 
measures). Performance measurement for outcomes is an ongoing process rather than an 
annual event, as with the State Preparedness System. 
5. Strategic Vision for Preparedness 
The roles of management and leadership are not addressed in depth in PPD-8, and 
it is integral to the OBF. Emergency management maintains the current level of 
performance and coordination; and homeland security leadership develops people and 
owns the future. The organization that operates the emergency management agency 
establishes a lofty mission for the agency, although it is the people in the agency who 
fulfill the mission and anticipate the needs of the parent organization and its stakeholders. 
It takes individuals with foresight to anticipate these needs and deliver them before the 
need arises; it takes initiatives (i.e., FEMA’s Strategic Foresight Initiative, FEMA Think 
Tank, and a number of executive level and expert panel discussions) to provide the vision 
an emergency management organization requires. Visioning provides a window into the 
flexibility and adaptability that is a necessary ingredient of the resilience outcome and the 
decision complexity the future has to offer. Having a strategy (a methodical approach) to 
not only develop the emergency management system today but to align it with a preferred 
tomorrow is central to the OBF—the PPD-8 only offers a national strategy with little 




In today’s economy, a preparedness system must be sustained at the local and 
state levels. Barring another major attack, federal funding will never return to 2005 
levels. The national level goal, outlined in PPD-8, continues to utilize a top-down 
approach to national preparedness; while OBF organizes some of the key components of 
PPD-8 and combines them with the known successes found in emergency management 
into a model. The hallmark of the OBF is that it departs from the historical approach of 
national preparedness and uniquely focuses on state-specific risk, goal-setting, and 
outcomes delivery. The strategy identified in the model is not a listing of all areas that are 
in need of attention to meet national preparedness. Rather, it is a focus of resources and 
the development of initiatives that are connected toward achieving the outcomes that 
support the resiliency of a state’s communities and economy, as well as delivering value 








The research muses the question: With the emphasis by Congress on homeland 
security performance, what benchmarks currently exist in emergency management for 
measuring outputs and impacts that indicate the level of preparedness of the nation? 
Moreover, is it possible to provide a single, one-size-fits-all set of metrics to place a 
value on outcomes? Thus, far, the research does not yield a quantifiable method to 
measure our preparedness efforts. The quantitative methods that exist are limited to 
inventorying personnel through credentialing, cataloging resources through NIMS typing, 
and observing capability through exercises and after-action reports. Checklists and 
inventorying mechanisms are valuable for tabulating the inputs needed to respond to 
particular events, but they will not necessarily capture whether the preparedness system 
has the ability to use those inputs to achieve the desired response outputs when an event 
actually occurs (Jackson, 2008, p. 8). 
With limited funding and uncertain future sustainability, a state’s emergency 
management strategy must be built upon networks of resources that improve the capacity 
to respond, absorb, adapt, and recover from emergencies or disasters. Given that 
networked capabilities provide resources within a prescribed mission space and that 
performance is delivered by a series of capabilities in action, positive results are achieved 
when mission, capability, and performance are focused during the disaster. Combining 
focused networks and leadership together will result in coordinated, effective, and 
efficient delivery of performance, where the true measurement of preparedness is 
observed both quantitatively and qualitatively. 
The question still exists: “How does one measure the actual outcomes of our 
disaster response and recovery programs” (Fugate, 2009. p. 2). The term emerging in 
today’s lexicon describing the preferred outcome is resilience. Resilience includes the 
quantitative capabilities to protect, respond, and mitigate, and the qualitative principles to 
resist, absorb, recover from, or successfully adapt to adversity or a change in conditions 
(HS Risk Lexicon, 2010, p. 23). The time it takes to arrive at the “new normal” is truly 
the measure of resilience. Furthermore, the most local level at which the response and 
recovery resources arrive (i.e., the local, tribal, state, or federal level) is where resilience 
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is most quickly achieved. Has the emergency management system addressed the critical 
strands in a holistic emergency management helix at all levels of entry? That is, has the 
system addressed: 
• Capacity sufficiently adaptable to meet a state’s risk environment 
• Prevention and mitigation before an event 
• Sufficiency of operational capability, capacity, and readiness to respond 
• Speed of protection measures during an event 
• Interoperability of operational resources to resolve the event 
These preferred outcomes delivered by networked resources support resilience 
quantitatively by the reduction in the loss of life and destruction of property, and by 
maintaining political, governmental, and infrastructure systems. It goes further to 
maintain the quality of life concerns of a stricken community through the protection of 
social and psychological structures, by minimizing the negative economic and 
environmental impact of the disaster, and by preserving a community’s heritage. It takes 
both management and coordination—and leadership and cooperation—to meet our 
nation’s future challenges. 
Many businesses and some homeland security professionals have seen the 
positive effect of balancing all focus areas of an organization, but can the balanced 
scorecard model be modified to improve state government’s ability to measure and 
improve the effectiveness of emergency management investments? How would it 
compare to the Presidential Policy Directive 8? The research has shown that it can be 
modified to account for the outputs of an emergency management agency, and at the 
same time, develop the relationships that are important during times of crisis. The 
mission of emergency management is not clearly defined, but the stakeholders clearly 
know when it is met. There are indicators of success that, when combined with 
leadership, provide the basis for the outcomes that the NPG is identifying. The PPD-8 
identifies some of these same indicators of success in the core capabilities. However, 
more emphasis should be placed on forward-leaning leadership and strategy for the 
homeland security enterprise that is identified by the Outcomes-Balanced Framework. 
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What performance outcomes should emergency management striving for, and 
what is a preferred strategy for achieving it? If the national goal is to identify the core 
capabilities that address specific types of incidents that pose the greatest risk to the 
nation, then the focus should be centered on capabilities that have historically proven 
successful. By observing the successes of these regional networks a pattern emerges. 
When applied elsewhere, it could serve as a roadmap for emergency management 
preparedness—these are smart practices that leadership has nurtured and, emerge during 
chaotic events. The outcomes that emergency management must support are those that 
address threats to the security and the quality of life in our communities. Knowing that a 
risk elimination strategy is both highly unachievable and potentially threatening to the 
very quality of life the nation is protecting, the strategy should be to contain and 
minimize the consequences of a disaster, as well as shorten the duration of the 
disturbance. A strategy that promotes and supports preparedness while also developing 
the capability to address the threats to our communities must be embraced. 
The research also recognizes that a one-size-fits-all approach will be destined to 
considerable scrutiny—what works in an urban, high-risk area will not work in rural, 
capability-reduced areas. Emergency management’s role is to focus its coordination 
efforts, base its efforts on a risk-informed analysis, and consistently communicate the 
strategy to its stakeholders to meet the challenges and find a method to assess its 
progress. A more appropriate assessment method is found within the Outcomes-Balanced 
Framework model; it supports outcomes in the emergency management mission space 
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